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THE PLACE OF WORKERS IN
CORPORATE LAW
KENT GREENFIELD *
Workers have no role, or almost no role, in the dominant contem-
porary narrative of corporate law. Corporate law is primarily about
shareholders, boards of directors and managers, and the relationships
among them. Occasionally, corporate law concerns itself with bond-
holders and other creditors. Only rarely, however, does a typical cor-
porate law course or a basic corporate law text pause to consider the
relationship between the corporation and workers.' This is despite the
fact that, by any account, workers provide essential inputs to a corpo-
ration's productive activities, and that the success of the business en-
terprise quite often turns on the success of the relationship between
the corporation and those who are employed by it.
The justification for insulating the concerns of workers from the
attention of corporate law is that such concerns are the subject of other
areas of the law, most prominently labor law and employment law.
* Assistant Professor of Law, Boston College Law School. J.D., University of Chicago; A.B.,
Brown University. The author thanks Victor Brudney, James R. Repetti, Joseph William Singer
and Aviani Soifer for helpful comments.
Here and throughout this Article, 'workers" refers to nonmanagerial employees. See, e.g.,
WILLIAM L. CARY Sc MELVIN A. EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 220-34 (7th
ed. 1995) (in a casebook containing 13 chapters and over 1500 pages, no chapter is dedicated
to the corporation's responsibilities towards its employees, and only 14 pages arc dedicated to a
section entitled "Interests Other than Maximization of the Shareholders' Economic Wealth");
JESSE. H. COOPER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 4-10 (4th ed. 1995) (a section
entitled "A Scorecard of the Players" lists managers, directors and shareholders, but does not list
employees); ROBERT W. HAMILTON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 558-72 (4th ed.
1990) (only 15 pages of 1200-page casebook dedicated to "'Social Responsibility' or the Lack
Thereof").
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Union matters are at the core of labor law; everyday employment
relations are the province of employment law. Issues such as plant
closings, if one were to judge by looking at the typical law school
curriculum, do not provide many legal puzzles. 2 Plant closings and
relocations might be covered in a labor law course, but usually only
long enough for students to learn that companies have no duty to
bargain over these actions.'
In the typical corporate law course, worries about workers are
usually dismissed (or perhaps "downsized”) quite early. This is typically
accomplished through a discussion of Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., a para-
digm case that stands for the proposition that corporate law deems it
impermissible for management (in that case, Henry Ford) to place the
concerns of workers (in that case, for high wages and a modern
workplace) on par with a concern for making profits for the sharehold-
ers (in that case, the Dodge brothers, who were seeking dividends to
start a rival car company). 4 The Michigan Supreme Court frowned
upon Ford's philanthropic impulses, declaring:
A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for
the profit of the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to
? This is notwithstanding the fact that much very good scholarship has focused, in one way
or another, on issues arising out of plant closings. See, e.g., Marlecn A. O'Connor, Promoting
Economic Justice in Plant Closings: Exploring the Fiduciary/Contract Law Distinction to Enforce
Implicit Employment Agreements, in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW 219 (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed.,
1995) [hereinafter O'Connor, Economic Justice]; Daniel A. Farber & John H. Matheson, Beyond
Promissory Estoppel: Contract Law and the "Invisible Handshake", 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 903, 938-42
(1985); Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalistic Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with
Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 Mn. L REV. 563, 630
(1982); Marleen A. O'Connor, Restructuring the Corporation's Nexus of Contracts: Recognizing a
Fiduciary Duty to Protect Displaced Workers, 69 N.C. L. Rev. 1189 (1991) [hereinafter O'Connor,
Nexus of Contracts] ; Joseph W. Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 611 (1988).
3
 Employers have a duty under the National Labor Relations Act to bargain with unions about
the effects of a plant closing, but they need not negotiate over whether the plant should be closed
in the first place. Ste First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 US. 666, 677-78 n.15 (1981);
Katherine Van Wezel Stone, The Legacy of Industrial Pluralism: The Tension Between Individual
Employment Rights and the New Deal Collective Bargaining System, 59 U. Cut. L. REV. 575, 588, 589
n.52 (1992). Moreover, according to Stone, effects bargaining generally takes place after the
employer has made and implemented a decision, when the union no longer has leverage to
protect its members. See Van Wezel Stone, supra, at 589 n.52. If the employer violates its obligation
to engage in effects bargaining, the remedy for the violation is limited to back pay, and is typically
calculated from five days after the date of the court or Board order until the time the parties
reach either agreement or impasse, not to exceed the time the employee actually was out of work
and not less than two weeks. See Transmarine Navigation Corp., 170 N.L.R.B. 389, 390 (1968). In
effect, then, this means that when a violation is found, the employer quickly bargains to impasse
and is liable for back pay for two weeks only. See Van Wezel Stone, supra, at 589 n.52 (citing, as
an example, Yorke v. NLRB, 709 F.2d 1138, 1144-46 (7th Cir. 1983)).
4
 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
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be employed for that end. The discretion of directors is to be
exercised in the choice of means to attain that end, and does
not extend to a change in the end itself, to the reduction of
profits, or to the nondistribution of profits among stockhold-
ers in order to devote them to other purposes. 5
Classes then turn to the Business Judgment Rule, which, it is said,
offers judicial deference with regard to the means but not the ends of
business activity. 6 The relationship between workers and the corpora-
tion, and between workers and other stakeholders, is considered again,
but only tangentially, when the class considers the Delaware takeover
cases. One case, the Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co. decision,' allows
directors of a company defending against a hostile takeover to consider
a wide range of possible effects of the takeover, including a number of
things that do not relate directly to shareholder wealth, such as "ques-
tions of illegality, [and] the impact on `constituencies' other than
shareholders (i.e., creditors, customers, employees, and perhaps even
the community generally)." 8 But, as students learn, courts cut back on
Unocal relatively quickly, especially in Revlon Inc. v. MacAndrews &
Forbes Holdings, Inc.9 The Revlon court appeared to reinterpret Unocal,
saying that the "board may have regard for various constituencies in
discharging its responsibilities, pthvided that there are rationally related
benefits accruing to the stockholders.'" In any event, the key lesson is that
corporate law—and by extension corporate lawyers—do not bother
much with the lives, interests and concerns of workers.
I try to change this a bit in my own corporate law class. We discuss,
for example, a case arising from the closing of United States Steel fac-
tories in Youngstown, Ohio." We address the workers' claims in the
Youngstown case that the company's various representations about
5 Id. at 684 (emphasis added).
6 For descriptions of the Business Judgment Rule, se IC I ERNEST FOLK ET AL.. FOLK ON TOE
DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW § 141.2.2,2 (3d ed., 1996); S. Samuel Arslit, The Business
Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 HOESTRA L. REv. 93 (1979); R. Franklin Balotti & James J. Hanks, Jr.,
Rejudging the Business flagmen( Rule, 48 Bus. LAW. 1337, 1339 (1993); Kent Greenfield & John
E. Nilsson, Grarigrind's Education: Using Dickens and Aristotle to Understand (and Replacer) the
Business Judgment Rule, 63 BROOK, L. REV. (forthcoming Spring 1998); Charles Hansen, The Duty
of Care, the Business Judgment Rule, and the American Law Institute Corporate Governance Project,
48 Bus. LAW. 1355 (1993).
7 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985).
8 Id.
9 506 A.2d 173 (Del, 1986).
16 Id. at 182 (emphasis added).
st See Local 1330, United Steel Workers of Am. v. United States Steel Corp. ("Youngstown"),
631 F.2d 1264 (6th Cir. 1980).
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keeping the plants open constituted enforceable promises.' 2 We talk
about the workers' assertions that over time they had developed some-
thing akin to a property interest in their jobs, which limited the com-
pany's ability to close the plants with impunity. 15 We explore the fact
that workers are not protected by federal fraud laws (which would have
limited the company's ability to mislead them about the probability of
keeping the factories open), even though capital investors are so pro-
tected.' 4 And, more generally, we discuss the corporation's duties in
such plant closing situations; we analyze whether the directors and
managers owe some duty to the workers other than those obligations
created under noncorporate law. But even in my class, these abstract
and idealistic notions are left behind as we turn to the nuts and bolts
of the duties of care and loyalty, basic securities law and the takeover
cases.
The taxonomy that insulates corporate law is artificial, to be sure,
and it is also more than a bit ironic. The decisions that corporate
managers make to guide the company on both the tactical and strate-
gic level have a great deal to do with workers. It is odd for lawyers who
seek to serve in the corporate setting to be taught, sometimes implicitly
and sometimes explicitly, that workers are a subordinate concern. But
this legal taxonomy is ironic for another reason. The economics of
corporations have much to do with workers. In many ways, the theory
of the firm—explaining why corporations exist at all—depends cen-
trally on certain notions about workers.' 5
 In turn, the law of corpora-
tions (if we credit the dominant narrative again) is based largely on
the economics of the corporation. Yet once we get to a description of
the law itself, the workers have been left behind.
12 See Farber & Matheson, supra note 2, at 938-42.
13 See Singer, supra note 2, at 614-22, 632-63.
14 See Kent Greenfield, The Unjustified Absence of Federal Fraud Protection in the Labor Market,
107 YALE U. 715, 717-22 (1997).
13 The modern theory of the corporation owes much to Ronald Coast, who theorized that
the firm exists when it is more efficient to engage in intra-firm transactions (organized by direct
authority) rather than market transactions. See R.H. COASE, THE FIRM THE MARKET AND THE LAW
33 (1988). Thus the theory of the firm depends much on insights about when it is most efficient
for people to work together within a firm rather than through individually-negotiated contracts.
Other writings on the economics of the firm turn on arguments about the consolidation of
productive work. See, e.g., Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs,
and Economic Organization, 62 Am. ECON. REV. 777 (1972) (arguing that the firm exists to
decrease the monitoring costs inherent in team produCtion); Michael C. Jensen & William H.
Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior; Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 .1. FIN.
EcoN. 305, 310-11 (1976) ("Contractual relations are the essence of the firm, not only with
employees" but with others as well; the firm is a legal fiction that "serves as a focus for the complex
process in which the conflicting objectives of individuals ... are brought into equilibrium . . .").
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This Article critiques the place of workers within corporate law
doctrine. The method by which this critique proceeds is by analyzing,
and criticizing, the arguments for shareholder dominance. These ar-
guments seek to justify a regime in which only shareholders have the
right to elect members of the board of directors, and in which the
management is held to owe fiduciary duties only to shareholders. My
thesis is that implicit, and often incorrect, assumptions about workers
form an important building block for corporate law theory and doc-
trine, Moreover, justifications for shareholder dominance—ownership,
agency costs, the residual nature of their claims and inability to con-
tract—are not as strong as generally proposed or often apply to workers
as well.
Like others who are making related arguments in the current
literature, 16 I seek to help justify the inclusion of workers' concerns and
interests within the heart of the corporate enterprise. More specifically,
I suggest that workers should have some kind of representation on the
board of directors or have some role in electing directors, and that
directors of companies should be held to have some kind of fiduciary
duties to workers in the employ of their firm.' 7 This Article is only a
" See, e.g., MARGARET M. BLAIR, OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: RETHINKING CORPORATE Gov-
ERNANCE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 16 (1995) (management should take into account the
effect of corporate decisions and actions on all stakeholders who contribute firm-specific assets
that arc at risk in the enterprise); Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoretical and Practical Framework for
Enforcing Corporate Constituency Statutes, 70 It.x. L. Rix. 579, 630-43 (1992) (stakeholders should
have standing to sue directors when corporate action harms them); Marl= A. O'Connor, The
Human Capital Era: Reconceptualizing Corporate Law to Facilitate Labor-Management Cooperation,
78 CORNELL L REV. 899 (1993) (corporate law should provide for employee representation on
boards); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Employees as Stakeholders Under State Nonsharehotder Con-
stituency Statutes, 21 STETSON L. REV. 45 (1991) (arguing lin - creation of fiduciary duties on behalf
of employees, but suggesting that state stakeholders statutes do not create such duties); see also
Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Theory of Corporation Law as a Response to Contracting
Problems in Team Production 6-7 (Sept. 26, 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author)
(corporate law, as a positive matter, recognizes directors' duties to non-shareholder stakeholders).
17 Admittedly, the presence of fiduciary duties tray not constrain directors' activities a great
deal. Even though such duties now clearly flow toward the shareholders, it is quite difficult for
shareholders to enforce them. Because of the Business Judgement Rule, courts tend to defer to
the decisions of management unless egregiously wrong or clearly unfair. See Victor Brudney,
Contract and Fiduciary Duty in Corporate Law, 38 B.C. L. REV. 595, 599-600 it.12 (1997) ("The
level of care required by the fiduciary standard is low, and the quality of judgment required is
even lower."). Moreover, a number of states, including Delaware, have provided or authorized
exculpation from monetary damage for violation of the duty of care. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (Supp. 1996); N.Y. Bus. CORP. Law § 402(b)(1) (McKinney Supp. 1997);
REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 2.02 (b) (4) (1994); see also Brudney, supra, at 600 n.12.
Nevertheless, especially if linked to other changes in corporate governance, fiduciary duties
that run toward workers may have some impact in how corporations behave. It is likely, for
example, that management would be held to a broader duty to disclose material information to
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partial contribution to this endeavor. I do not here make the affirma-
tive arguments essential to this normative project nor do I attempt to
answer likely objections.1 9 The focus of this Article is to question the
affirmative claims of those who argue for shareholder dominance. This
critical examination of these claims will anchor future work.
I. THE PRELIMINARY QUESTION OF OWNERSHIP
The justification for shareholder dominance that probably would
leap most quickly to mind for many traditional corporate law scholars,
and many lay people, is the notion that the shareholders are the
owners of the corporation. Shareholders contribute the capital and
hire the management. The corporation is merely the form through
which the shareholders aggregate and utilize their property.' 9 The
authority of the corporation ultimately rests with them. A corporation
is arranged to serve its shareholders first and foremost simply because
the shareholders own it.
Yet, this concept of "ownership" no longer provides the dominant
justification in corporate law scholarship for shareholder preemi-
nence. As Jonathan Macey says: "rClontrary to popular belief, it is
not particularly useful to think of corporations in terms of property
employees. See Robert C. Clark, Agency Costs versus Fiduciary Duties, in PRINCIPALS AND /WEN-1-s:
THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 55, 71 (John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser eds., 1985) (noting
that an affirmative duty to disclose information is one of the "common attributes of the fiduciary
relationship"); Greenfield, supra note 14, at 724, 729-30, 786 (describing how at common law
the duty to disclose usually follows from the existence of fiduciary duties, though employers arc
not typically held to have fiduciary duties to their employees). Moreover, the existence of such
duties would encourage directors to show that they had considered the interests of workers when
they made important corporate decisions, such as closing a plant or merging with another
company. See Greenfield & Nilsson, supra note 6 (describing how directors charged with fiduciary
duties to a range of non-shareholder constituencies might discharge their duties).
For example, I will not answer the assertion that directors cannot effectively serve two
masters. See FRANK H. EASTERIIRCIOK & DANIEL R. FisCIIEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 38, 70 (1991) (making this claim); Jonathan R. Macey, An Economic Analysis of
the Various Rationales for Making Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary
Duties, 21 STETSON L. REV. 23, 31-36 (1991) (stating that "too many masters" argument is
overstated); O'Connor, supra note 16, at 958-59 (answering this claim). Nor will I answer the
argument that the inclusion of workers in corporate governance will result in shirking on their
part. See Stephen Bainbridge, Privately Ordered Participatory Management: An Organizational
Failures Analysis 82 (Oct. 24, 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (employees'
lack of control is a way in which they bond their promise not to shirk).
19 See Larry D. Soderquist & Robert P. Vecchio, Reconciling Shareholders' Rights and Corporate
Responsibility: New Guidelines for Management, 1978 DUKE L.J. 819, 820 (1978) (describing tradi-
tional view).
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rights."20 Nicholas Wolfson emphasizes: "Shareholders are not owners."''
Nevertheless, property-based arguments for shareholder rights fre-
quently appear in the popular press. 22 It is thus worth examining what
the claim from property is and why it fails to provide a persuasive
rationale for shareholder dominance in corporate law.
The property-centered justification for shareholder rights found
voice in the work of Milton Friedman, the Nobel Prize-winning econo-
mist who once popularized the claim that the "one and only . . . social
responsibility of business" was to increase its profits. 23 According to
Friedman, the corporation is owned by the shareholders, and the
" Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities, Firm-Specific Capital Investments, and the Legal Treatment
of Fundamental Corporate Changes 1989 DUKE U. 175, 175 (1989); see also JESSE H. CIIOPER ET
AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 28-29 (3d ed. 1989) (contractarians "deny that
any one class of participants (i.e., the shareholders) have a natural right to view themselves as
the owners of the firm"); Eugene Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL.
EcoN. 288, 289 (1980) (abandoning "the typical presumption that a corporation has owners in
any meaningful sense").
21 NICHOLAS WOLFSON, THE MODERN CORPORATION: FREE MARKETS VERSUS REGULATION 40
(1984) (emphasis in original); see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, Community and Statism: A Con-
servative Contractarian Critique of Progressive Corporate Law Scholarship, 82 CORNELL L. REv. 856,
863 n.22 (1997) (ownership not a meaningful concept in contractarian analysis of corporation).
22 A Wall Street Journal columnist, for example, used property-based language in defending
AT&T's Chairman Robert Allen's decision to discharge 40,000 employees while accepting a $16.2
million compensation package. See Holman W. Jenkins, Jr., Business World: 40,000job Cuts! Where
Does He Get Off?, WALL ST. J., Mar. 5, 1996, at A15. Allen was acting on behalf of "the owners,"
presumably the shareholders, See id. Because he owes duties to the "owners," Jenkins argues that
Allen was right to refuse to "substitut[e] his own 'social conscience' for the interests of the people
paying his salary." Id. The debate about whether AT&T should have discharged so many workers
ought to be decided, according to this view, simply by reference to property rights. Another recent
example comes from Albert Dunlap, the former Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Scott
Paper, who gained the nickname "Chainsaw Al" when he cut 11,000 jobs. See Does America Still
Work? (Forum), HARPER'S, May 1996, at 35, 36. In a forum on corporate downsizing, Dunlap
opposed arguments in favor of corporate social responsibility by using the duty- and rights-based
language of property. See id at 37, 44. It is, said Dunlap, the sole responsibility of corporate
management to deliver value to the shareholders, who "own the corporation." See id, In fact,
Dunlap has equated efforts to encourage corporate social responsibility with "socialism." See
Nightline: Interview with Albert Dunlap and Robert Reich (ABC television broadcast, Feb. 14, 1996)
(available in LEXIS, News Library, Script File). Consider also the comments of Walter M. Cabot,
a corporate director and financial manager who participated in a 1991 conference at Stetson Law
School about changes in corporate governance. See Walter M. Cabot, The Free Market Promotes
Long-Term Efficiency That Benefits All Stakeholders, 21 STETSON L. REV. 245 (1991). Cabot asserted
that "[i]ndividual stock ownership rights are fundamental rights, grounded in the U.S. Constitu-
tion" and described such rights as "sacred" and "inherent." Id. at 251; see also id. (implying that
attempts to enact stakeholder statutes equate to socialism).
"Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES
(magazine), Sept. 13, 1970, reprinted in MANAGERIAL DECISION MAKING AND ETHICAL VALUES:
COURSE MODULE 1, 5 (Kenneth E. Goodpaster & Thomas R. Piper eds., 1989) [hereinafter
Friedman, Social Responsibility]. Friedman added a caveat, however, saying that executives should
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shareholders therefore have a right to expect that the managers of
their property will, first and foremost, look out for them by making "as
much money as possible."" Insofar as social concerns cause a corporate
executive to reduce the corporation's returns to shareholders, the
executive is spending "their" money and, in effect "imposing taxes" on
shareholders. 25
 This is impermissible because property should not be
taken for the use of others without the owners' consent. Corporate
charitable contributions, for example, should be impermissible be-
cause the "corporation is an instrument of the stockholders who own
it ... [and s]uch contributions should be made by the individuals who
are the ultimate owners of property in society." 26
 Indeed, Friedman
equated loosening the corporation's duty to shareholders with "pure
and unadulterated socialism."27
This reference to socialism was largely unexplained, but Fried-
man's meaning is not difficult to discern. Socialism, in Friedman's view,
is theft of the personal right to hold private property and rejection of
a private economic sphere. Adjustment in the rules of corporate law is
an encroachment into this private sphere. For the state to broaden a
corporation's responsibilities beyond the shareholder-owners would
extract the owners' private resources for public purposes and would
make private property the instrument of the state. This, apparently, is
as much a violation of the rights of property ownership as, say, state-
mandated cooperative farms.
The property-based justification for shareholder dominance begs
the question, of course. Asking whether directors should owe fiduciary
duties to workers or whether workers should have a say in electing
directors is, in one sense, simply asking again whether shareholders
should "own" the firm. One cannot answer this question simply by
saying that the shareholders own the firm." At heart, the property-
make as much money as possible "while conforming to the basic rules of the society, both those
embodied in law and those embodied in ethical custom." Id. at 2. He did not explain what he
meant by this phrase. Later in the same piece he stated the caveat differently, saying that the
profit-maximizing goal should be pursued while "staying within the rules of the game," explained
as "open and free competition without deception or fraud." Id. at 5; see also MILTON FRIEDMAN,
CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133 (1962) [hereinafter FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM];
CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS 75-76 (1975) (discussing caveat).
"Friedman, Social Responsibility, supra note 23, at 2.
25 see id,
"FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM, Supra note 23, at 155.
27 Friedman, Soda! Responsibility, supra note 23, at 1; see also supra note 22 (noting others
who equated corporate social responsibility with socialism).
28 See BLAIR, supra note 16, at 224 (argument that shareholders own the corporation and
thus should be able to control it "is simply circular logic"); Singer, supra note 2, at 637-38 ("To
assume that we can know who property owners are, and to assume that once we have identified
them their rights follow as a matter of course, is to assume what needs to be decided.").
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based conception attempts to answer the question of why shareholders
are dominant in corporate law simply by reference to the fact that they
are dominant in corporate law.
Perhaps Friedman and other property theorists should be taken
to offer a more subtle argument. They might be said to argue that
shareholders certainly have some property interest in the firm, usually
represented by the shares they hold, and that this ownership interest
should not be limited. With ownership comes control. 29 To require
directors to take workers' interests into account would limit sharehold-
ers' property rights, and such limitation is inconsistent with the very
nature of those rights.
This argument, too, is unpersuasive. It is founded on a simplistic
notion of the sanctity and indivisibility of property rights. Notwith-
standing the "illusion of absoluteness" that accompanies much prop-
erty-rights rhetoric, property has always been subject to reasonable
regulation." An adjustment in corporate governance is just that—a
regulation. 3 ' Even if shareholders are considered the owners of the
corporation, one would have to provide a much more sophisticated
defense of why such ownership gives absolute power to shareholders
to block changes in corporate governance.
Few truly believe that ownership of corporations brings with it
absolute power to defend against adjustments in the corporate enter-
prise. The simplicity of the claim that an adjustment in corporate
governance offends property rights is highlighted when one compares
it to debates about other public policy choices that affect business
enterprises. The minimum wage provides a good example. In 1996,
the U.S. Congress increased the minimum wage from $4.25 to $5.15
per hour. 32 Note the similarities of an increase in the minimum wage
with, say, a "stakeholder statute" requiring corporate directors to con-
sider the needs and interests of employees when making corporate
decisions.ss Both proposals may well impose costs on the corporation
22 See BI.AIR, supra note 16, at 223-24 (relating this argument as one of the principal
arguments for shareholder control).
3° See MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISIIMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE
18,20 (1991).
31 See Kent Greenfield, From Rights to Regulation in Corporate Law, in 2 PErtspEcrivas ON
COMPANY LAW 1, 21-25 (Fiona M. Padield ed., 1997) (arguing that corporate law should be seen
as a branch of public law rather than private law).
32 See Hilary Stout, Clinton Signs Measure Raising Minimum Wage, WALL ST. J., Aug. 21,1996,
at A16.
33 A majority of states have adopted stakeholder statutes, which allow corporate directors to
take the interests of non-shareholder stakeholders into account when making decisions for the
corporation. See Steven M.H. Wallman, The Proper Interpretation of Corporate Constituency Statutes
and Formulation of Director Duties, 21 STETSON L. REV. 163, 163-65 (1991) (describing Pennsyl-
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that result in a decrease in shareholder return. Both proposals re-
strict the internal decisionmaking of the corporation—the minimum
wage statute by disallowing labor contracts offering wages below the
statutory minimum, the stakeholder statute by disallowing agreements
between management and shareholders that include a promise by
management to maximize returns without concern for the firm's em-
ployees. Both proposals impose mandates on the corporation that were
not necessarily assumed by the shareholders when they purchased their
shares.
In the debate about the minimum wage, however, an argument
that a legislated increase is impermissible because the shareholders
'own the corporation" seems unresponsive." People seem to under-
stand that the debate about an increase in the minimum wage turns
on, and should turn on, the effect of such an increase on workers,
companies and the economy as a whole. 35 A shared assumption is that
vania statute). Only Connecticut's statute includes language that requires, rather than permits,
directors to consider non-shareholder stakeholders. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-756 (West
1997). According to Charles Hansen, only Iowa, Indiana and Pennsylvania (in addition to
Connecticut) permit directors to place other constituencies on the same footing as stockholders.
See Charles Hansen, Other Constituency Statutes: A Search for Perspective, 46 Bus. LAw. 1355,1370,
1375 (1991); see also Ronald M. Green, Shareholders as Stakeholders: Changing Metaphors of
Corporate Governance, 50 WAstt. & LEE L. REV. 1409,1411-12 (1993); Wallman, supra, at 194-96.
These statutes were adopted largely to increase corporations' abilities to fight hostile takeovers
by lessening the duty of directors to accept the highest bid for the company. See Greenfield &
Nilsson, supra note 6.I1 is still unclear whether these statutes will have much utility in encouraging
a broader view of corporate social responsibility outside the takeover context, especially because
employees and other stakeholders do not typically have standing to enforce the stakeholder
statutes. In fact, several statutes explicitly deny that they create any enforceable duty to the
constituencies whose interests may be considered. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-202(b) (5)
(1991) (declaring that the director's authority is discretionary and "shall not be deemed to
provide to any constituency any right to be considered"); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 717(b) (McKin-
ney Supp. 1997) (providing that "nothing in this paragraph shall create any duties owed by any
director to any person or entity to consider or afford any particular weight" to non-shareholder
considerations or abrogate any existing directorial duties); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1717 (West
1995) (limiting standing to shareholders).
The scholarship on stakeholder statutes is fairly extensive. In addition to the articles above,
consider David Millon, Communitarianism in Corporate Law: Foundations and Law Reform Strate-
gies, in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAw, supra note 2, at 1; William J. Carney, Does Defining
Constituencies Matter?, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 385 (1990); James J. Hanks, Jr., Playing with Fire:
Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes in the 1990s, 21 STETSON L. REv. 97 (1991); Macey, supra
note 18, at 33-35; Morey W. McDaniel, Shareholders and Stakeholders, 21 STETSON L. REV. 121
(1991). For a compilation of stakeholder statutes, see Symposium, Corporate Malaise—Stakeholder
Statutes: Cause or Cure?, 21 STETSON L. REv. 279 app. (1991).
34 1 have argued elsewhere that such ownership rhetoric is a throwback to the kind of
rights-based discourse prevalent during the Lochner era. See Greenfield, supra note 31, at 11,
17-19 (noting similarities between rights-based assumptions of many corporate law scholars and
the rights-based assumptions of the . Supreme Court in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)).
35
 For example, during the debate on the minimum wage, The Wall Street Journal, a vigorous
opponent of the minimum wage increase, published views of a number of economists about the
March 19981	 WORKERS iN CORPORATE LAW	 293
the "rights" of the shareholders are beside the point in the debate."
The language of property rights ought to have no greater place in a
discussion of proposals to change the rules of corporate governance,
even though as a matter of fact it is a common part of at least the
popular discourse.
Another way in which the ownership justification for shareholder
dominance falls short is in its failure to take note of the fact that the
law has long recognized that "ownership" assumes obligations as well
as rights.37 The broad principle that one should not use one's prop-
erty to inflict harm on others has been "applied routinely" in U.S.
courts since the nation's beginning." The Supreme Court recognized
over 150 years ago that "[w]hile the rights of private property are
sacredly guarded, we must not forget that the community also have
[sic] rights."39 A property owner cannot burn noxious trash in her
backyard so as to cause a nuisance to her neighbors, for example, and
a factory owner may not operate a factory that is unreasonably danger-
ous to the employees working there. There is little in the nature of the
ownership claim itself that differentiates these obligations from, for
example, the duty to take into account the interests of long-term
workers before deciding to close a factory." It is unhelpful for Fried-
man and others to use the metaphors of property as a normative
argument for shareholder dominance without an explanation of why
some aspects of the metaphor are relevant and others are not.
An additional, fundamental objection to Friedman's property-
based view asks why, in any event, shareholders are deemed to be the
owners of the corporation. To be sure, shareholders own their shares.
But bondholders own their bonds, suppliers their inventory and work-
ers their labor. They all contribute what they own to the corporate
enterprise. As Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout write, "shareholders are
not the only group that provides essential, specialized inputs into
public corporations."" Among these contributors, no one is making a
issue. Minimum Wage vs. Supply and Demand, WALL ST. j., Apr. 24,1996, at A14. These economists
analyzed the proposed increase in economic terms, not in terms of the rights of the shareholders
of the companies that would be required to pay the higher wages. See id. No economist said that
raising the minimum wage was impermissible because it forced tnanagers to give away money
that "belongs" to the shareholders. See id.
30 See Editorial, Repeal the Minimum Wage, WALL Sr. J., Apr. 29,1996, at A22 (opposing an
increase in the minimum wage but not raising the issue of the ownership rights of shareholders).
s7 The clearest voice in the academy making this point is Joseph Singer. See, e.g., Joseph W.
Singer, Rent, 39 B.C. L. REV, 1 (1997); Singer, supra note 2.
38 See GLENDON, 51.(pre note 30, at 25.
39 Id. at 26 (citing Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420,548 (1837)).
48 See Singer, supra note 2, at 659-63.
41 Blair & Stout, supra note 16, at 6.
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charitable act; they each expect to earn some return on their contri-
bution. And the input of each is essential to the success of the firm.
To say that shareholders are the only "owners" is to say that there is
something inherent in the act of contributing money to buy shares—or
in the definition of "ownership"—that distinguishes that act from the
act of contributing money to buy bonds issued by the company, or
contributing raw materials to be refined by the company or contribut-
ing labor for the company to use.
Moreover, as Joseph Singer has observed, the law frequently
deems property interests to have been created as the result of relation-
ships and understandings on which people rely over time." Examples
include rules surrounding "adverse possession, prescriptive easements,
public rights of access to public property, tenants' rights, equitable
division of property on divorce, [and] welfare rights."'" Singer argues
that workers often develop reliance interests in their jobs analogous to
other kinds of reliance interests that are recognized by the law. 44 Singer
states that:
Rather than seeing the corporation and the workers in isola-
tion, and assuming that the corporation has absolute freedom
to dispose of "its" property as it sees fit we can see the corpo-
ration and the workers as together having established and
relied on long-standing relations with each other in creating
a common enterprise. The rights of the members of the
common enterprise cannot be fully articulated by reference
to ownership rights defined a priori or by the explicit terms
of written contracts. If workers are considered to be part of
the corporation, rather than factors of production or hired
hands, our analysis of property rights changes."
Thus, if property rights are the touchstone for corporate law, work-
ers can be seen as having cognizable property interests in the firm
and in their jobs.
Even on property grounds, therefore, we ought to be critical of
the rule of shareholder dominance. As mentioned above, however, the
argument for shareholder dominance from notions of property is no
longer the leading explanation within corporate law. Instead, the domi-
nant paradigm now depends on contract principles: "[T] he modern
42 See generally Singer, supra note 2, at 622, 663-77.
43 Id. at 622.
44 See id. at 621, 656.
45 Id. at 657.
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theory of the firm tells us that, while each participant in the corporate
enterprise owns certain inputs (labor, capital, machinery, inventory),
the firm itself is nothing but a web of contractual relationships among
these various production factors." 46 The contractarians thus believe
that the "relevant inquiry" does not concern "who owns the corpora-
tion."47 Instead, the dominant explanations today relate to agency
costs, residual claims, contracting problems and general notions of
efficiency. The remainder of this Article will analyze these arguments.
II. THE PROBLEMS OF AGENCY
A. Shareholders and Agency Costs
Many contractarians believe that the fundamental concern of cor-
porate law is "agency costs," the issue of how shareholders can reduce
the costs of delegating control over financial capital to corporate man-
agers." This theme traces its roots to the work of Adolf Berle and
Gardiner Means, who in 1932 published their famous book, The Mod-
ern Corporation and Private Property." Their thesis was that the key
problem in corporate law was the separation of ownership and con-
tro1.6° It has been posited that the many and dispersed owners of the
modern corporation, each of whom has contributed only a small per-
centage of the company's financial capital, collectively do not have
the incentive to control corporate management effectively.'" Managers
thus are able to engage in activities that are not necessarily in the
interests of the shareholders. While contractarians would not agree
that shareholders are powerless, many do believe that the "fundamen-
tal insight of the Berle and Means theory—that there are costs of
46 Macey, supra note 20, at 175.
47 Id.; see also David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201, 229 ("The new
theorists also reject the utility of the conception of shareholders as 'owners' of the corporation,
preferring instead to describe shareholders as only one among the various suppliers of 'inputs,'
whose rights are determined by the interrelation of the various contracts that define and consti-
tute the corporate enterprise.").
45 See, e.g., EASTERBROOK Fiscitac, supra note 18, at 9-11, 14-15; Alchian Demsetz, supra
note 15, at 778, 791-93 (the key clement of the firm is the "centralized contractual agent in a
team production process"); Fama, supra note 20, at 289 (abandoning "the typical presumption
that a corporation has owners in any meaningful sense"); Jensen & Meekling, supra note 15, at
308-10 (problems of the corporate form are essentially agency problems).
49 ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, TIIE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROP-
ERTY (1932).
50 See id. at 124.
5t See HENRY N. BUTLER & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, TILE CORPORATION AND TILE CONSTITUTION
2 (1995).
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delegating control over financial capital to corporate managers—pro-
vides the cornerstone of the contractual theory of the corporation." 52
For many contractarians, the key problem is thus that managers
are "less than perfect agents" of the shareholders.' Henry Butler and
Larry Ribstein identify a number of potential conflicts between man-
agers and shareholders, including differences in effort, time horizon
and risk aversion. 54 Effort is a concern because managers do not reap
all the gain of their work if they succeed and do not suffer all of the
losses if they fail; thus they may not work as hard for the corporation
as the shareholders would like.55 "Horizon" refers to the point that a
manager's interest will diverge even more from that of the sharehold-
ers as the manager approaches retirement or prepares to leave the firm
for other reasons. Risk aversion is another point of difference, because
diversified shareholders are risk neutral with regard to individual se-
curities in their portfolios, whereas managers, wanting to retain their
jobs, are more likely to make decisions to minimize the risk of firm
bankruptcy. 56 In other words, managers tend to make decisions that
are insufficiently risky from the shareholders' perspective.
According to many contractarians, the purpose of corporate gov-
ernance, and of corporate law, is to reduce these agency costs. 57 Con-
tractarians observe that the law and the market have worked together
to instill a set of protections for shareholders. 58 One such protection is
the product market: if the firm is run inefficiently, it will have a difficult
time selling its products (whether goods or services) on competitive
terms. 59 If managers want to keep their jobs, they will try to improve
the firm's efficiency
52 Id. at 2-3.
55 id. at 3; see alsoJohn W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauscr, Principles and Agents; An Overview,
in PRINCIPLES AND Aciurrs: Tint STRUCTURE or BUSINESS, supra note 17, at 2-3 (describing the
agency relationship). Friedman also relied on the agency metaphor to argue that corporate
managers may not engage in corporate social responsibility activities. "In a free-enterprise, private
property system," said Friedman, "a corporate executive is an employee of the owners of the
business. He has direct responsibility to his employers. That responsibility is to conduct the
business in accordance with their desires ... ." Friedman, Social Responsibility, supra note 23, at
2. Friedman asserted that the "whole justification" for allowing managers to be selected by
shareholders was that the managers are agents "serving the interests of [their] principal." Id. at
3.
54 See BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 51, at 3. They also identify under-leveraging and
dividend payouts as issues in which the interests of shareholders and managers differ.
55 See Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAIND. L. REV. 1259, 1262
(1982),
56 See BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 51, at 3.
57 See Fischel, supra note 55, at 1261-65.
58
 See id. at 1264.
59
 See id.
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Perhaps the most important market protection is the efficient
capital market, which rapidly incorporates information about a com-
pany into the prices for that firm's securities." If corporate manage-
ment pursues actions that harm investors, the price of the firm's
securities will fall in the capital market. The efficient market also allows
investors to sell their interest in firms whenever they hear that manag-
ers are failing to maximize profits. The liquidity of the security means
that existing shareholders can dispose of their security before they
suffer significant harm from managers' actions. Potential shareholders
are protected as well, because it is assumed that the price of a firm's
security will accurately reflect the management's diligence in maximiz-
ing returns for the shareholders.
If management is inefficient, the price of shares will tend to be
less than what it would be under efficient management. This will make
a takeover of the company cheaper and more likely. 6' Because take-
overs usually result in a change in management, a manager who wants
to keep her job will work to maintain a high share price. An efficient
capital market thus reduces agency costs by disciplining managers
through the possibility of takeovers. This is the so-called market for
corporate control.
There is also an employment market for corporate managers
themselves. 62 If managers are considered good at their jobs, i.e., if they
maximize the share price of their firms, they will often be compensated
either directly or indirectly. 63 Perhaps other shareholder-dominated
firms will try to entice them away, or their present firm links their
compensation package to overall firm profitability. If managers are
seen to be doing poorly, their personal wealth will likely decrease over
time. This market for the managers themselves thus decreases the
difference between the interests of the shareholders and the managers.
Shareholders as a group are also protected by the presence of
stockholders who own sizeable blocks of shares." These shareholders—
usually large institutions—have both the incentive and the ability to
monitor the activities and performance of corporate management in
ways other than simply through the price of the firms' shares." When
60 See BUTLER & RIESTEIN, supra note 51, at 5, 147 n.8 (describing market efficiency theory,
citing Eugene Fama, Random Walks in Stock Market Prices, 21 Fug. ANAL. J. 55 (1965)). For a
general review of the efficient capital market hypothesis, see RONALD J. GILSON & BERNARD S.
BLACK, TIIE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS 155-81 (2d ed. 1995).
61 See Fischel, supra note 55, at 1264.
62 See BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 51, at 9.
63 See Fische!, supra note 55, at 1263.
64 See BUTLER & RDISTEIN, supra note 51, at 9.
65 1u 1994, 56% of the shares of the 1000 largest U.S. corporations were held by institutions.
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Fidelity telephones, even the head of General Electric is likely to pick
up the phone. Individual, small shareholders are protected by being
able to free ride on the monitoring done by larger shareholders.
According to conventional corporate law doctrine, however, all
these market devices, while powerful, are not sufficient to reduce
agency costs to the optimal level. 66 The law must also step in by impos-
ing fiduciary duties on management to serve the shareholders. Share-
holders desire these protections because market protections are imper-
fect. Fiduciary duties thus theoretically cause managers to be reluctant
to shirk or self-deal because of the risk that such behavior could subject
them to costly litigation. These duties are seen as "gap-fillers,"67
 in that
they impose duties on management in the absence of explicit agree-
ments. In fact, these legally-imposed duties are seen as efficient alter-
natives to "writing lengthy and complicated contracts." 68 To be ef-
ficient, the law should (and does, it is claimed) "approximate the
bargain that investors and managers would reach if transaction costs
were zero."6° It is central to the contractarians' view, then, that share-
holders and managers are, and should be, able to contract around
these legal duties if they reduce agency difficulties at too high a cost."
In the view of the contractarians, therefore, fiduciary duties are
essentially a market protection, too. The protection is a result of the
implicit contract between the shareholders and managers, which pro-
vides that if managers do not adequately serve the interests of the
shareholders, and other forces do not control such behavior, the share-
holders can go to court for redress. Importantly, shareholders can also
discipline management through the power of voting their shares. If
they believe new management could do better, they can vote for new
board members."'
In any event, the key rationale for the presence of a judicial
remedy and for shareholder voting rights is the desire to reduce the
difference between shareholder and managerial interests. This is taken
Moreover, most of the shares held by institutional investors are held by a relatively small number
of all such institutions. See CARY & EISENBERG, supra note 1, at 244-45.
66 See BUTLER & RIUSTEIN, supra note 51, at 6 (noting that the optimal level of agency costs
is unlikely to be zero).
67 See id. at 12.
68 Fischel, supra note 55, at 1264.
69 Id.
" See, e.g., BUTLER & RIDSTEIN, supra note 51, at 12. Note, however, that even though 30111C
states have adopted statutory provisions allowing companies in effect to waive the duty of care,
these statutes do not extend to an allowance for waiving the duty of loyalty. See supra note 17.
71 See BUTLER & IllasTemr, supra note 51, at 8. Even if shareholders in fact rarely vote for a
change in management, the fact that they have the power to do so reduces the likelihood that
management will shirk or self-deal.
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as a given. If agency costs are not reduced, it is assumed that share-
holders will choose to place their financial capital in other financial
vehicles (insured bank accounts, for example, or bonds protected
through covenants) or they will demand higher or more secure divi-
dends.
B. Workers and Agency Costs
It is assumed that the purpose of corporate law is to reduce agency
costs between managers and shareholders, and not other stakeholders
such as employees. At first glance, this is merely stating the obvious.
But let us consider the role of employees and agency costs more closely.
Few have recognized that employees have "agency costs" of their
own, in the sense that they must depend on the actions of management
even though their interests do not always coincide. Admittedly, it is
unusual to speak in terms of agency costs from the workers' perspec-
tive, since agency law typically concerns itself with the problems asso-
ciated with the difficulties managers/principals face in ensuring that
employees/agents satisfy the desires of the manager/principal. But the
problem is mostly semantic. There can be "agency costs" in relation-
ships that do not meet the legal definition of a principal/agent. In any
ongoing contractual relationship, there are costs associated with moni-
toring to ensure that the other contracting party is satisfying her
obligations under the contract."
Employees in a firm, in fact, must bear certain monitoring costs—
"agency costs"—associated with making sure that the firm's manage-
ment is keeping their interests at heart. One might claim here that
workers do not have the "right" to have this concern, because manag-
ers are not their servants. But once we remove ourselves from the realm
of property and adjudge the corporate form in contractual terms,
workers have (at least) whatever "rights" they bargain for successfully.
What is important at this juncture is to notice that workers have some
of the same problems as shareholders: they contribute something of
value to management and they must depend on management both to
maximize the return on that input and to share that return with them.
Workers, like shareholders, give up control over something of
worth when they invest it in the firm. In the case of shareholders, it is
72 See Pratt & Zeckhauser, supra note 53, at 2 ("Whenever one individual depends on the
action of another, an agency relationship arises." (emphasis in original)); id. ("In many contexts,
the agency relationship may be reciprocal."); see also Jensen & Meelding, supra note 15, at 310
("Contractual relationships arc the essence of the firm, not only with employees but with suppli-
ers, citstomers, creditors, etc. The problem of agency costs and monitoring exists for all of these
contracts • .
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money. In the case of workers, it is skill, time and effort. In both cases,
the contributors' willingness to part with the resource depends on an
assessment that they will receive more by contributing it than by with-
holding it. Shareholders must determine that they will make more
money or suffer less risk by holding their money in stock than in some
other vehicle, Workers must determine that they will receive more (in
terms of money, job security, benefits, working conditions, training,
safety or pleasure) than they would receive by working elsewhere or
for themselves, or by engaging in leisure activities."
The judgment of both the shareholders and the workers depends
on their assessment of management. As Greg Dow and Louis Putter-
man declare, "it is unclear why equity investors have a greater need for
safeguards against managerial abuse than employees."74 Shareholders
believe that buying shares is better than putting money in savings
accounts, for example, because shareholders believe that managers can
utilize the productive capacity of the firm to make a better, or safer,
return than other possible investments. Workers show up to work
because they believe that the managers can organize their labor and
other resources so that they can be more productive than the sum of
their productiveness as individuals, and that they will share in the gain.
Like shareholders, workers depend on the care, skill and good faith of
the management. If the managers do not take care, or are stupid, or
look after themselves only, both the shareholders and the workers will
be harmed. The shareholders will receive less return on their invest-
ment. The workers will have jobs that are less attractive—lower paying,
less secure, less safe. So both parties must take care to reduce the
"agency costs" of giving over control of something they value to man-
agement.
Of course there are ways both shareholders and workers can
reduce these agency costs. As discussed above, the market for corporate
control and the ease of selling stock in an efficient and liquid market
assists shareholders in holding managers accountable to them." The
presence of large, institutional shareholders who have the ability and
incentive to monitor closely managers' performance means that small,
individual shareholders are protected."
"See Blair & Stout, supra note 16, at 25-26 (positing that the directors arc "hired" by those
who make up the firm, including employees, to mediate among their interests: "it is no longer
obvious that employees should be viewed as agents of the managers to whom they report").
74 Greg Dow & Louis Putterman, Why Capital (Usually) Hires Labor: Art Assessment of
Proposed Explanations, Department of Economics Discussion Papers, Simon Fraser Univ. 32
(Nov. 1996 draft) (on file with author).
76 See supra notes 60, 61.
76 See supra notes 64, 65.
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Workers have fewer market protections. To be sure, they are en-
gaged with the work of the company and with management every day.
A shareholder gives over her money and does not see where it is put
to use, but a worker knows better where his labor, skill and effort are
allocated. He may therefore better monitor how his own contribution
is being used. Moreover, a worker can actually see important indicators
of management strategy and performance: levels of maintenance; size
of inventories; and managers' mood and demeanor.
But there is much, and much that is important, that a worker
cannot see, and much that shareholders can see better. Workers do
not, as a rule, have the same access to senior management that at least
large institutional shareholders enjoy. Workers are not represented on
the board of directors and are not privy to important strategic discus-
sions that affect the company as a whole. Workers are not protected,
as shareholders are, by a federal regime of fraud protection and man-
dated affirmative disclosure of facts material to them." Indeed, there
are huge informational asymmetries between employers and workers.
Workers, for example, cannot know very well about their impact on
firm profitability. 75 (In fact, there are numerous examples of firms
misleading employees about this very matter.) 79
77 See Greenfield, supra note 14.
78 See O'Connor, supra note 16, at 924.
"In the Youngstown case, for example, management continuously assured workers that their
plants were profitable and that the company would not close the plants as long as they remained
so. See Local 1330, United Steel Workers of Ain. v. United States Steel Corp., 631 F.2d 1264,
1270-77 (6th Cir. 1980). In the end, the company closed the plants saying that the plants were
not profitable, apparently Using a different definition of "profit" than they had used before, See
id. at 1279 (reviewing plaintiffs' argument that the version of "profitability" the company used in
setting goals for employees was different from the version the company used in deciding to close
the plants); see also id. at 1276 (setting out company's representation to employees that plants
were "presently profitable" as of May 1979); id. at 1273 (describing company chairman's statement
in June 1979 that "hi he Youngstown plant is profitable"); id. (relating company's representation
to employees in November 1979 that the "Ohio Works has been profitable"); cf. id. at 1278
(reviewing Chairman's testimony before the district court, in which he claimed that as of October
1979 that the plants had lost $300,000 for the year).
A more recent example comes from the Hathaway shirt factory in Waterville, Maine, where
a mostly female work force has been sewing Hathaway shirts for over 150 years. See Adam Zagorin,
Short-Skirted in Maine, TIME, June 3, 1996, at 58. In early 1995, Linda Wachner, the Chief
Executive Officer of The Warnaco Group, Inc., Hathaway's parent company, went to Waterville
to quell fears of an imminent plant closing. Sales were booming in Warnaco's various brands,
and the stock price was soaring. See id.; see also Industry-by-Industry, Who Leads the Field in
Shareholder Returns, WALL. Si', J., Feb. 27, 1997, at R4 (Warnaco's stock's five-year average return
was the second best within its industry group). According to one account, Wachner assured
Waterville workers that she "would not close the plant" if the employees "would do quality work
and bring the cost of the shirt down." Sara Rimer, Fall of a Shirtmaking Giant Shakes Its Hometown,
N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 1996, at A14. Afterward, the employees forfeited a raise to help pay for
productivity consultants for the plant, and the employees' union persuaded the company to adopt
a joint labor-management program to address workplace problems and to improve productivity.
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Moreover, even when workers see evidence that the management
is not acting in their best interest, there is less they can do about it.
Workers can quit, of course, just as shareholders can sell. But the cost
of quitting is much higher for a worker than the cost of selling for a
shareholder." The cost of selling shares in a very liquid market is
typically quite low, both in terms of transaction costs and in terms of
finding a suitable replacement investment. Furthermore, a diversified
shareholder will suffer the cost of a company's poor management in
only a small percentage of her portfolio. A worker, however, must bear
high costs when she quits for several reasons. Because of the nature of
the input, a worker will be less "diversified" than a typical shareholder.
A worker will tend to hold only one or two jobs; a shareholder may
own scores, even hundreds, of stocks. 8 ' Any harm suffered because of
poor management thus will be felt more strongly by the worker than
the shareholder. The cost of moving from one job to another is also
much higher than selling one stock and buying another. Labor is much
less mobile than capital, and the labor market is less liquid and less
efficient than the capital market." It will take longer for a worker to
find a substitute job, and the substitute is less likely to be close to what
the worker had previously.
Both these harms will be felt even more if the worker has devel-
oped firm-specific skills. Such skills make a worker more valuable to
her present employer, but also make her more vulnerable to a firm's
opportunistic behavior. 83 More specifically, after workers develop firm-
specific skills, the "exit option"—going to work for a different com-
pany—becomes more costly. The firm, then, often has greater incen-
tives to renege on any implicit agreements of job security or wage rates
See Rimer, supra, at A14; Union Efforts to Increase Productivity Not Enough to Keep Warnaco Plant
Open, Daily Lab. Rep. (DNA) No. 98, at D-9 (May 21, 1996) [hereinafter Union Efforts]. By March
1996, the employees had doubled the factory's productivity. See Rimer, supra, at A14; Union
Efforts, supra, at D-9. The productivity consultant claimed that the employees had "turned this
plant around." Rimer, supra, at A14. Warnaco, in the meantime, recorded unprecedented profits.
See Union Efforts, supra, at D-9. On May 6, 1996, however, Wachner announced that Warnaco
would quit making the Hathaway line and either sell or scrap the Waterville plant. See Rimer,
supra, at A14; Union Efforts, supra, at D-9. Hathaway shirts were said to be not keeping up with
Warnaco's other, more profitable product lines. See Rachel Spevack, Warnaco Pulling Plug on Me
Patch, DAILY NEWS REC., May 7, 1996, at 1. See generally Greenfield, supra note 14, at 721 n.26
(discussing cases).
80 See Dow & PurrzamAN, supra note 74, at 32 ("[Wlorkers cannot easily diversify by holding
more than one job at the same time, and . . . switching jobs generally involves significant costs
. . . ."); Greenfield, supra note 14, at 749-50; Van Wezel Stone, supra note 16, at 46-47.
81 See O'Connor, supra note 16, at 925.
82 See Greenfield, supra note 14, at 749-50; O'Connor, supra note 16, at 924-25.
63 See Greenfield, supra note 14, at 779-80; Macey, supra note 20, at 191-92 (noting that the
development of firm-specific skills by rank-and-file workers exposes them to possible exploita-
tion); O'Connor, supra note 16, at 909-10, 916-17.
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or working conditions, because its management knows that the total
compensation package (including wages, security and working condi-
tions) the firm's workers would receive elsewhere is equal to that
received by workers without such firm-specific skills. 84
All this is to say that shareholders certainly are not the only ones
who need to worry that management is taking their interests to heart.
Workers, too, must be concerned that the management will take care
and be loyal to the enterprise. The usual story about shareholders
needing and wanting to reduce agency costs inherent in their contri-
bution of their productive input applies, in many ways, to workers as
well. And workers are less protected by market mechanisms than are
shareholders.
It is not clear, then, why corporate law should step in to reduce
further the agency costs between managers and shareholders yet not
between managers and workers. The presence of fiduciary duties that
run only to shareholders and voting rights held only by shareholders
cannot be explained by the presence of agency costs alone. There must
be an additional component of the argument—something that relics
on the fact that shareholders already get more protection from the
market than do workers. The argument might be that corporate law
should reinforce what the market already protects and should not
reinforce what the market does not protect. Yet this is a provocative
claim, and it is hardly obvious. It is actually an argument not at all
about agency costs but about the role of law. This argument would
suggest that the law should bolster the interests of those market par-
ticipants who already exercise market power. In the last analysis, this
argument holds that the market is the best adjudicant of public policy,
and efficiency the key determinant of good governance. This claim is
considered in Part V.
III. THE CORPORATION AND RESIDUAL CLAIMS
A. The Residual Nature of Shareholders' Claims
Many corporate law writings make the point that the shareholders'
equity stake in a firm is in the nature of a residual claim. 88 That is to
say that within the very definition of a common share is the notion
that its holder is entitled to the value of whatever is left after all others
with claims against the company are satisfied. When the company is
114 See Macey, supra note 20, at 191-92 (illustrating how employers can exploit workers who
have developed firm-specific skills); O'Connor, supra note 16, at 925.
B5 See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 18, at 10-11,67.
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worth less than the sum of all the prior claims, the common shares are
worth nothing. When the company is worth more than the value of
the prior claims, the common shareholders are entitled to the entire
remaining, or residual, value.
One might argue that shareholders deserve to be dominant within
the corporate structure because of this residual interest, because that
is what having a residual interest means. Ownership is by definition the
residual claim. Shareholders, because they accept this residual claim,
are the owners of the firm. The firm is thus properly designed to serve
its owners.
The difficulty with this argument is that, like the more simplistic
argument from the nature of ownership itself," it includes the answer
in the assumption that frames the question. There is nothing inherent
in the nature of a residual claim that means that its holders' interest
should be maximized above all others." One can certainly imagine, for
example, a company that acknowledges responsibilities to a number of
stakeholders, but still issues common stock that constitutes residual
claims on the financial surplus of the company. Said another way, one
can imagine a corporate "contract" that does not link the residual
claim on financial assets with a sole claim on the attentions of the
directors."
A more nuanced argument for the dominance of the shareholders
depends instead on the assertion that the residual nature of the share-
holders' claim makes the shareholders the best protectors of the firms'
interest." That is, the shareholders' interests and the interests of the
enterprise as a whole can be said to be more closely aligned than are
the interests of other claimants and the firm. The residual claimants'
interests conflate with those of the firm because, as claimants on what
is left after all other claims are paid, they want the company to maxi-
mize long-run profits, which in turn maximizes the value of their
66 See supra notes 23 to 28 and accompanying text.
87 See Macey, supra note 18, at 27 ("'[o]nce we view the shareholders as simply the residual
claimants ... it is far from self-evident that shareholders are necessarily entitled to control the
firm,' i.e., to have managers' and directors' fiduciary duties flow exclusively to them") (quoting
CIEOPER ET AL., supra note I, at 29).
88 See EASTERBROOK & FISCHE2., supra note 18, at 36 ("Corporate ventures may select their
preferred constituencies."); WOLFSON, supra note 21, at 40 (noting the residual nature of share-
holders' claims but stating that "IsThareholders are not owners; they are risk fakers") (emphasis in
original).
" See CHOPER ET AL., supra note 1, at 33 ("Uniquely, the residual claimants of the firm arc
interested in the firm's overall profitability, whereas creditors and managers are essentially fixed
claimants who wish only to see their claims repaid . ."); ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW
389-90 (1986) (voting power should go to residual claimants, "who have the best incentive to use
the power"); EASTERBROOR & FISCHEL, supra note 18, at 68 ("As the residual claimants, share-
holders have the appropriate incentives ... to make discretionary decisions.").
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claims." The requirement to serve the shareholders, then, is arguably
the best and closest proxy for a requirement to serve the interests of
the enterprise as a whole. Indeed, it can be asserted, their interests are
so congruent that there is little meaning in speaking of the difference
between serving the shareholders and serving the enterprise. To serve
one is to serve the other. This reasoning also provides the basic ration-
ale for giving the shareholders the power to install or replace directors.
No one else, it could be said, has the proper incentives to make
decisions on behalf of the entire enterprise. As shareholders look after
their personal interest they also inherently look after the interests of
the firm. A corollary to these propositions is that, if the directors are
required to look after the interests of non-residual claimants or if
anyone else is allowed to have a say in corporate governance, the firm
will lose out, because the interests of other claimants will diverge from
those of the firm. 9 '
B. The Residual Nature of Workers' Claims
For purposes of this Article, the most fundamental critique of the
residual claim justification for shareholder dominance rests on the key
point that workers, too, have claims against the firm that are residual
in nature.92 To begin, workers' claims against the corporation are not,
80 See EASTER.BROOK & FISCIIEL, supra note 18, at 36.
91 See id. at 69.
92 Therc are other weaknesses as well. One of its (laws is that the argument depends on the
notion that all shareholders want the same things for the firm. Easterbrook and Fischel argue
that "the shareholders of a given firm at a given time are a reasonably homogeneous group with
respect to their desires for the firm." Eas-rtunitoox & FISCIIEL, supra note 18, at 70; see also
Bainbridge, supra note 18, at 81 (noting that shareholders are "generally united by a desire to
maximize share value"). To be sure, shareholders all want to make money. Beyond that broad
generalization, however, there is often much less agreement among shareholders than is assumed.
Some investors plan to hold their shares for the long term and will be more interested in
long-term returns; others will be looking for quick profits. Some shareholders will be more risk
averse than others. Some shareholders—such as union pension funds or socially responsible
mutual funds—tend to be more concerned about the interests of non-shareholder constituencies
and thus will be more willing to forgo some return to take account of those interests. Some
shareholders will be pro-management, perhaps because they are managers themselves, and others
will be extremely skeptical of management prerogatives. The putative homogeneity of share-
holder preferences may evaporate in any number of concrete situations.
To the extent that there is indeed agreement among shareholders, that very agreement
actually may include the assumption that a company should not make decisions solely on the
basis of what maximizes returns to shareholders. In research peribrined by Larry Soderquist and
Robert Vecchio, shareholders of large, publicly traded corporations were asked whether they
agreed with the following statement: "If corporate profits could be increased by moving a plant,
the corporate managers of a large, publicly held corporation should weigh the effect the move
would have on its employees, customers, suppliers and people in the community it presently is
in before deciding to move." Soderquist & Vecchio, supra note 19, at 841. Almost 90% (88.5%)
of the shareholders agreed with that statement, 41.3% strongly so. See id. Shareholders were also
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in any meaningful sense, fixed." This is clearly true for high-level
employees whose compensation is tied closely to the fortunes of the
firm, through profit sharing or stock options. But, it also applies to
employees who work either for a set salary or for an hourly wage. Such
workers have both implicit and explicit claims against the enterprise
that are more valuable when the company does well and that are worth
less (or nothing) when the company does poorly. Unfixed explicit
claims against the company include pension or other retirement
benefits, which can constitute a significant percentage of a worker's
net worth and can lose much of their value if the company fails. 94
Unfixed implicit claims include understandings about job security, the
development of firm-specific human capital, the safety of working con-
ditions, promotions policies and expectations, and the like. Much
scholarly work has been done to illuminate such implicit under-
standings between employees and their employers." There is no doubt
that many, if not most, workers believe that they do better when their
employer does well, and that they do worse when their employer does
less well. Put another way, when a company's management makes good
decisions for the enterprise as a whole, workers' fortunes improve even
if their wages or salaries remain the same. When a company's manage-
asked to respond to the claim that: "When making corporate decisions, corporate managers of
large, publicly held corporations should consider the interests of shareholders, bondholders,
customers, employees, and perhaps others." Id. Six percent agreed "somewhat," and almost 16%
agreed "moderately." See id. Over 75% of shareholders "strongly agreeldJ" with this statement,
making it clear that shareholders do'not expect their interests to be considered to the exclusion
of those of all other stakeholders. See id. (emphasis added). This would seem to falsify Stephen
Bainbridge's claim that investors "are generally united by a desire to maximize share value."
Bainbridge, supra note I8, at 81.
93 Cf. EASTEREROOK & FISCI1EL, supra note 18, at 11 (noting that employees and other
non-shareholder stakeholders have "relatively" fixed claims against the enterprise).
94 See, e.g, Varity Corp. v. Howe, 116 S. Ct. 1065 (1996). In Varity, the defendant company
created a separately-incorporated subsidiary in which they could place a number of the parent
company's outstanding debts and commitments. The plan was to allow the subsidiary to fail and
go into bankruptcy, eliminating the obligations. Among the obligations the parent company
sought to eliminate were those arising from the parent company's benefit plan's promises to pay
certain medical and other non-pension benefits to employees. The parent enticed about 1500
employees to move to the new subsidiary with various representations that their benefits would
remain secure if they voluntarily transferred to the subsidiary. These representations were lies,
as the parent company knew that the subsidiary was insolvent from the day of its creation. The
subsidiary indeed collapsed after two years, and the employees lost their non-pension benefits.
See id. at 1068-69. The Court held that the employer had breached the fiduciary duty it owed to
its employees under ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994). See Varity, 116 S. Ct. at 1074.
95
 See, e.g., O'Connor, Economic Justice, supra note 2, at 219-24; O'Connor, Nexus of Contracts,
supra note 2, at 1205-22; O'Connor, supra note 16, at 905-11; Van Wezel Stone, supra note 16,
at 48-53.
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ment makes poor decisions for the enterprise, workers' fortunes de-
cline even if their wages or salaries are unchanged."
Some of the confusion surrounding which of the stakeholders are
residual claimants results from the commonplace juxtaposition of the
terms "residual" claimants and "fixed" claimants.° This is a false com-
parison, because not all non-residual (prior) claims are fixed. What is
pivotal for corporate doctrine, moreover, is not whether a claim is prior
or residual, but whether the claim is variable and correlates positively
with the fortunes of the firm. The question of whether shareholders
should be dominant does not really turn on where they stand in
priority when the firm is to be liquidated. In the day-to-day decision-
making of most companies, the probability of liquidation in the short-
to-medium term is a quite low." What is much more likely, and much
more important, is that the company "will continue to operate, gener-
ating gains and losses to different claimants . . . "99 Workers' claims
against the company, for example, need not come last in the unlikely
event of liquidation in order to increase in value when the company's
fortunes improve and decline in value when the company does poorly.
The significant correlation between the gains and losses to non-share-
holder stakeholders and the overall health of the enterprise greatly
weakens the claim that the best proxy for the health of the firm is the
return to the shareholders.
Bernard Black underscores this very point in a forthcoming arti-
cle.'" He defines "residual interest" in a firm "to involve any situation
in which the expected value of a contracting party's future dealings
with the firm increases as the firm's value increases, and decreases as
the firm's value decreases."°' With this definition, Black argues that
"the contractarian premise that only shareholders are residual claim-
ants is factually false."'" As a class, employees clearly "gain when the
96 See Macey, supra note 18, at 29-31 (illustrating how an exclusive focus on shareholders'
interests can result in wealth transfers from non-shareholders to shareholders, while also decreas-
ing the overall value of the firm).
97 See, e.g., CHOPER ET AL., supra note 1, at 33 ("Uniquely, the residual claimants of the firm
are interested in the firm's overall profitability, whereas creditors and managers are essentially
fixed claimants who wish only to see their claims repaid ...."); EASTERBROOK & FISCIIEL, supra
note 18, at 68 (comparing shareholders' "residual" claims with the "fixed" claims of others);
Bainbridge, supra note 18, at 81 ("[S)hareholders are the only corporate constituent with a
residual, unfixed, ex post claim on corporate assets and earnings. In contrast, the employees'
claim is fixed ex ante through agreed-upon compensation schedules.").
"See Bernard Black, Corporate Law and Residual Claimants 19 (droll Dec, 1997).
99 Id.
19°
 See id.
101 Id. at 4.
102 Id. Robert Clark appears to agree. See Clark, supra note 17, at 57 (noting that large publicly
held corporations have "numerous residual claimants").
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firm prospers, and lose when it suffers."" Indeed, the employees'
"aggregate gains or losses are often of the same order of magnitude as
gains or losses to common shareholders."'"
In any event, if by residual claim one means the total net positive
wealth of the corporation, it is emphatically not true that "[o]nly
shareholders have an economic incentive to care about the size of the
residual claim."'" Employees, too, have incentives to care. Similarly, it
is not true that "shareholders are unique because they hold variable
claims to a firm's income stream."" Employees, too, have variable
claims.
The interests of employees actually may be the best proxy for the
interests of the firm. Consider risk aversion. If we are to believe the
assumptions of the contractarians, shareholders invest in a number of
different companies and thus have diversified their portfolios." They
are therefore risk neutral (and perhaps even risk prone)" with respect
to the decisions of any specific company. Diversified shareholders pre-
fer that the management of any particular company they invest in
makes decisions that maximize the expected value of the results, even
if the results also are highly variable. 109
 That is, shareholders will tend
to prefer risky decisions that may provide high payoffs but risk bank-
ruptcy over decisions that provide lower returns but have less risk of
pushing the firm into liquidation."° Indeed, shareholders are indiffer-
ent as to the liquidation'risk of any particular company they invest in
1 " Black, supra note 98, at 4, 18-19.
1I/4 Id. at 4. Black goes on to consider why, as a positive matter, employees and other non-
shareholder residual claimants do not typically receive voting rights to protect their residual
claims. See id. at 32 (noting positive nature of the article). Black's article suggests seven possible
explanations for why employees usually do not receive formal control rights "even though they
have large residual interests": limited transferability of the employees' interests; heterogeneity
within the class of employees; problems with giving the same control rights to different classes;
costs of multiple veto rights; delegated monitoring (the notion that most of the time, the
shareholders will act in ways that are congruent with employees' interests); firm complexity; and
the existence. of other informal control rights for employees. See id. My concern is more directly
to analyze the normative claim that fiduciary duties and voting rights should flow to shareholders
because of the residual nature of their claims.
105 Bainbridge, supra note 18, at 81.
196
 Macey, supra note 20, at 180.
1 °7 See. EASTERBROOK & FISCIIEL, supra note 18, at 29 (discussing how diversification makes
investors risk-neutral).
108 See Macey, supra note 20, at 181 ("Shareholders have a powerful incentive to induce their
firms to engage in activities that fixed claimants would consider excessively risky.").
1" See EASTERRROOK FISCHEL, supra note 18, at 98 ("A decision is good to the extent it
has a high expected value, although it may also have a high variance.") (emphasis in original).
"° See Lynne L. Dallas, Working Toward a New Paradigm, in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW,
supra note 2, at 35, 42, 47 & n.56 (describing concrete ways in which a pursuit of profit
maximization may be inconsistent with a company's survival); see also Macey, supra note 20, at
181 n.27 (quoting Klein & Coffee's assertion that "from any starting point, holding the total
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as long as their portfolio, as a whole, maximizes their expected returns.
As Easterbrook and Fischel state, "the investor wants to maximize the
value of his holdings, not the value of a given stock."
Workers, on the other hand, are not diversified in their labor
investment—they typically work for one employer at a time and may
have invested much time and effort to develop firm-specific human
capital."2 They are not risk neutral; as to their employment, they are
risk averse. Rather than being indifferent as to the liquidation risk of
the company for which they work, they care deeply about their firm's
financial health because they face harsh consequences from unemploy-
ment if their firm suffers." 3 If their company goes bankrupt, workers
typically lose a great deal—their jobs, the value of any firm-specific
skills and sometimes a portion of retirement or pension benefits. Work-
ers thus prefer that the management of a company they work for not
make decisions with a high variance, even when such decisions have a
high expected return. Workers instead prefer decisions that value
stability, even with a lower expected total return.
The workers' interests arguably function as a better placeholder,
then, for the best interests of the firm. Because shareholders are
relatively indifferent as to the possibility of any single firm failing,
managers who make decisions according to what is good for the share-
holders will bring about the failure of their companies more often than
managers who make decisions based on what is good for a broader mix
of stakeholders. If the question is what is better for the firm, it is not
so clear that shareholders' desires should dominate, at least if we
define "what is better for the firm" to include survival.
The core issue, of course, is whether firms themselves should be
risk averse as to their own demise. If so, then the claim that sharehold-
ers' interests are the proper proxy for the interests of the company is
weakened significantly. It is perhaps enough, at this juncture, to note
that this issue is not one that has been discussed extensively in the
literature. It is simply taken for granted that, because the interests of
the shareholders should dominate, firms should be risk neutral. But
this question has not been considered from the other end of the
crucial nexus. If we are trying to decide whether shareholders should
be the only stakeholder considered by management in making deci-
market value of the firm and of all securities constant, a decision that shifts investments in such
a way as to increase .. risk will result in an increase in the value of the common [stock] and a
decrease in the value of the bonds.").
III EASTERBROOK FISCIIEL, supra note 18, at 28.
III See supra notes 81, 83.
113 See O'Connor, supra note 16, at 908 n.26.
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sions and whether shareholders should be the only ones with voting
rights, we need to decide whether firms should be risk averse as to their
own liquidations.
The question as to whether firms should be risk averse—that is,
should act as if survival is a value to be pursued—depends on whether
such risk aversion makes society as a whole better off)" There is little
reason to believe that society as a whole is risk neutral with regard to
corporate decisions. Society benefits from corporate growth, of course,
but it is also concerned with stability and the avoidance of harm. It
would be eminently reasonable for society to decide to forgo the
possibility of very high corporate profits in order to avoid the dispro-
portionate harm workers (or communities, or creditors) would suffer
if risky business decisions do not pay off. This is especially true if a
subset of society—those who own shares"5—reap a disproportionate
share of the gains if the risky decision does pay off. Said another way,
it is fairly clear that society as a whole (or, for that matter, any of us as
individuals, in our daily lives) is not an absolute profit maximizer." 6
There are other economic and noneconomic "goods" we value. It
would be odd, then, to assume without question that a major subset of
our law—the area that regulates the internal workings of some of the
most powerful institutions in our culture—should be constructed to
maximize profit at all costs.''''
In any event, it is important to note that once the difference in
risk aversion is considered, the argument for shareholder dominance
depends on the claim that workers and other stakeholders care too
much about the fortunes of the firm. A proponent of the shareholder-
centered view of corporate law would have to make the ironic argu-
ment that it is better for society as a whole for the decisionmaking of
each individual firm to be dominated by stakeholders who care little
114 See Greenfield, supra note 31, at 21-25 (arguing that corporate law should be evaluated
not on the basis of rights-based discourse but on the basis of which let of doctrines makes society
as a whole better off).
115 The vast majority of total stock assets are owned by the country's richest citizens. While
the poorest 90% of those in the United States own 11% of the stock, the richest 10% own 89%
(and the richest 0.5% own 31%). See Does America Still Work!, supra note 22, at 44.
116 See Greenfield & Nilsson, supra note 6 (arguing that traditional corporate law is based on
the irrational utilitarian fixation on the maximization of utility, and that there are other values
that corporations should, and do, pursue).
117 Easterbrook and Fischel admit that if people are risk-averse "they might v.-ant a rule
maximizing the lower bound of returns rather than maximizing the expected return." EASTER-
BROOK & F►SCHEL, supra note 18, at 30. They argue that the law should not reflect a preference
for risk aversion because "people who do not like risk can look after themselves at low cost." Id.
While this assertion may be true for capital investors, it is certainly not true for workers, who
cannot easily diversify away their exposure to firm-specific risk.
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about the fortunes of each firm. On its own terms, this is hardly a
straightforward proposition. And it is surely not what shareholder
proponents typically say. As described above, the usual argument is that
shareholders are the only ones who have incentives to care about the
success of the firm. But that is certainly not the case. Workers, too,
have incentives to care, And workers who depend on their company
for their livelihood are bound to care more about the success and
survival of their individual firm than do shareholders who own hun-
dreds of stocks in diversified portfolios."'
N. CONTRACTING PROBLEMS
A. The Relational Nature of the "Contract" Between Shareholders and
Management
The dominant contemporary narrative of corporate law describes
the corporation as a nexus of contracts among managers, shareholders,
workers, bondholders, other creditors, customers, the community and
assorted others."9 It is the marketplace writ. sma11. 12° As David Milton
recently put it, "[t]he corporation is thus [seen as] nothing more than
an arena in which suppliers of capital, labor, services, materials and
other necessary contributions come together to pursue their own in-
terests through bargain and exchange. "121 These various parties nego-
tiate with one another to create the entity called a corporation and to
determine the precise terms of the legal relationships that constitute
it.'" As a normative matter, contractarians argue that the law should
116 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 410 (4th ed. 1992). Posner states
that:
The typical shareholder ... is not knowledgeable about the business of the firm,
does not derive an important part of his livelihood from it, and neither expects nor
has an incentive to participate in its 'management. He is a passive investor and,
because of the liquidity of his interest, has only a casual and often transitory
relationship with the firm.
Id.; see also Fischel, supra note 55, at 1276 ("The investor who holds securities in multiple firms
is unlikely to have the interest or expertise to participate in running any particular firm.").
112 See, e.g., EA-STEW:H(00K FISCHEL, supra note 18, at 12 ("we often speak of the corporation
as a 'nexus of contracts " '); Alchian & Demsctz, supra note 15, at 793 ("The firin serves as a highly
specialized surrogate market."); Fischel, supra note 55, at 1273 ("The corporation . , . is nothing
more than a legal fiction that serves as a nexus for a mass of contracts."); Jensen & Meckling,
supra note 15, at 310 ("Contractual relations are the essence of the firm . . . ."); Macey, supra
note 20, at 179 ("[A] corporation is simply a net of . , . contractual relationships . ."); see also
Millon, supra note 47, at 229-31 (describing theory).
120 See William T. Allen, Contracts and Communities in Corporation Law, 50 WAsit. & LEE L
Ittv. 1395, 1400 (1993).
121 David Milton, Personibing the Corporate Body, in 2 GRAVEN IMAGES 116,123 (1995).
122 See Macey, supra note 20, at 179.
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recognize the "benefits of private ordering" and thus should "respect
the legal arrangements accepted by those within the firm." 123
Significantly, the legislative and judicial processes are seen as a
part of the "contract," at least when it comes to the portion of those
processes that create the fiduciary duties of corporate law. As Jonathan
Macey asserts, "twlithin every successful enterprise, a complex bargain-
ing process allows rights to be 'sold' to those who value them the most.
The corporation's charter, bylaws, and, to some extent, the laws of the
situs in which the corporation chooses to incorporate, reflect the
precise outcome of this process." 124 The corporate law of a particular
jurisdiction is seen as a part of the corporate "contract" in that it
establishes a set of "off-the-rack" legal rules that mimic what investors
and their agents would typically contract to do. If the law is inefficient,
it is assumed that the various parties will choose to opt out of the
default provisions through explicit contractual terms or will locate
their firms (the nexus of their contracts) in some other, more efficient
venue.' 25
But why does corporate law typically impose fiduciary duties as a
part of this "off-the-rack" contract between managers and sharehold-
ers, when fiduciary duties are uncommon in most contracts?'"Accord-
ing to contractarians, the answer lies in the long-term, "relational"
nature of the contract between shareholders and managers.I 27 Share-
holders hold residual claims, and it is difficult to foresee and resolve
ahead of time all the potential contingencies that might affect those
claims.'" "The only promise that makes sense in such an open-ended
relation," according to contractarians, "is to work hard and honestly."'"
To enforce such a vague promise, then, the shareholders receive the
right to vote and the protection of fiduciary principles.
This reasoning may describe why fiduciary duties are a part of the
understanding between shareholders and managers, but it does not,
of course, explain why their duties appear as a part of corporate law.
If they are so crucial to the , shareholder/manager relationship, why do
they have to be imposed by the state rather than simply arising as a
product of explicit contracting between parties? The contractarian
answer to this question is that these duties would indeed be a product
of explicit contract if the parties "could have bargained . . . at no
123 id,
121 Id. at 179-80.
125 See Milton, supra note 47, at 230-31.
126 SIT EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 18, at 90.
127 se, id.
128 See Fischel, supra note 55, at 1264.
129 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 18, at 91.
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cost.""° As Fischel asserts: " [T] he reason for having a fiduciary princi-
ple , . . is the high cost of specifying things by (express) contract.""'
These transaction costs are even higher after the company has raised
equity capital, , because "investors have no practical way of revising the
articles on their own to overcome intervening legal surprises."'" In this
view, then, the law finds it necessary (i.e., efficient) to impose a set of
fiduciary duties on managers because that is how most firms would be
organized explicitly but for obstacles to actual negotiation. As Fische!
asserts, "ffliduciary duties serve . . . as a standard form contractual
term in every agency [corporate] contract."'" In the view of contrac-
tarians, shareholders are the exclusive beneficiaries of the managers'
fiduciary duties because "shareholders face more daunting contracting
problems than other constituencies."'"
B. Workers' Contracts
Workers and other stakeholders, according to contractarians, do
not need fiduciary duties in their contracts because their contracts can
be specific enough to make the imposition of fiduciary duties ine-
fficient.'" "If contracts can be written in enough detail," say Easter-
brook and Fischel, "there is no need for 'fiduciary' duties as well."'"
According to contractarians, there is nothing inherently different be-
tween workers and capital investors: "notice that a contractual ap-
proach does not draw a sharp line between employees and contributors
of capital. " 197 The difference is just that in the contractarian world view,
workers can protect themselves through explicit contracts, and capital
investors cannot.'" Workers, because their rights can be specified,
"must look to their contractual rights rather than invoke fiduciary
claims."'" And if employees bargain for a certain contract with only
limited contractual protection from, for example, shocks in the labor
market, "they ought not grumble if they are held to their bargains
when business goes bad. Each investor must live with the structure of
risks built into the firm . . . . [I] t is all a matter of enforcing the
contracts. And for any employee . . . that means the explicit negotiated
130
 1d. at 92.
131 Id. at 93.
132 Id.
133 Fischel, supra note 55, at 1264.
i"Macey, supra note 18, at 36.
133 See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 18, at 90.
"6 Id.
1" id at 37.
t38
	 Macey, supra note 18, at 36; Macey, supra note 20, at 197.
EASTERBROOK & FlscltE4, supra note 18, at 91.
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contract." Indeed, the absence of protections within the labor con-
tract does not mean, according to contractarians, that workers are
unable to bargain for those protections. "Rather, the absence of con-
tractual protection ... may simply reflect the fact that such [non-share-
holder] constituencies are unwilling to pay for such protection in the
form of lower wages . . .
To take a specific example, Jonathan Macey admits that the devel-
opment of firm-specific human capital exposes workers to the possibil-
ity of exploitation through forced renegotiation of their contracts. 142
The employees can solve this problem, says Macey, "by forming a union
to ensure that they will not be treated opportunistically." 14s In other
words, if the contract does not protect them, the workers should be
able to depend on collective action to protect their interests. The law,
or at least corporate law, does not need to be the source of protec-
tion. 144
To be sure, these contractarian assumptions about the power of
workers to protect themselves through contract and market forces are
open to challenge. It would hardly seem obvious to most people,
especially to most workers, that employees have greater ability to pro-
tect themselves from managerial exploitation than do capital investors.
This assumption seems unconnected to the reality of economic rela-
tions in the late twentieth century, and it seems odd to urge that
rank-and-file workers should and can rely on their own market power
while the already considerable market influence of venture capitalists,
investment bankers, mutual funds and other institutional investors
needs to be bolstered and protected by fiduciary duties imposed by
law.
Yet, contractarians would almost certainly admit, if pressed, that
their views do not depend on an empirical claim that workers and
other non-shareholder stakeholders could actually protect themselves
through contract or collective action. Rather, contractarians would
argue that any attempt to help workers through law and regulation
would result in a worse. outcome than if they relied on their (even
140 Id. at 37.
"I Id. at 36.
142 See Macey, supra note 20, at 191-92; see also supra notes 83, 84 and accompanying text
(discussing this problem in the context of the discussion of agency costs).
145 Macey, supra note 20, at 192.
144 Though it also appears that Macey would argue that other, noncorporate, law and regu-
lation should not be used to assist workers either. See id. at 174-75 (listing reasons why "the private
contracting process ... generates outcomes superior to the outcomes generated by government
regulation"); id. at 195-97 (criticizing the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act,
29 U.S.C. §§ 2101-09 (1994), which offers sonic employees of some companies advance notifica-
tion of some plant closings and layoffs).
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presumably) weak market power. 196 This outcome comes about because
employers would, in effect, force' workers to pay for any benefit they
received through the law.
This argument that workers will be hurt by laws that are intended
to help them is subject to serious objections. 146 Yet, even setting such
objections aside for the moment, it is useful to focus on the contrac-
tarian claim that workers should be forced to depend on the rights
that they are able to gain through contract bargaining, while capital
investors are properly assisted by law in their bargaining with manage-
ment. This claim rests on certain assumptions about the contracting
process that occurs (explicitly or implicitly) between shareholders and
management, and these assumptions then are used as the basis for
legal intervention. If these same assumptions hold as well for the
contracting process between workers and management, however, then
the argument for shareholder dominance is weakened.
Consider first the contractarian claim that it is very difficult for
shareholders and managers to anticipate the various contingencies that
might affect shareholders' claims. 1 h 7 This claim would appear to hold
for workers as well. Once one recognizes that workers' claims on their
employers are not fixed, as illustrated in Part III above, it becomes clear
that the ability to define rights, and obligations specifically for the
duration of an employment relationship becomes very difficult, if not
impossible. If shareholders—who are assumed to own diversified port-
folios and who buy and sell stock in a liquid, efficient market—have a
"contract" with management that is considered "relational,""" then this
categorization must be doubly true for workers, who typically work for
one company at a time and who often stay in their jobs for many
years.'" A vast array of factors can affect the relationship between
workers and management. To the extent that it is difficult to place in
writing all the important aspects of the shareholder/manager relation-
ship, it is surely at least equally difficult to reduce to writing all the
important considerations that influence the employee/employer rela-
tionship.
145 See Macey, supra note 18, at 37 (arguing that changing the law to add a fiduciary duty to
the employer/employee relationship will harm workers).
148 See O'Connor, Nexus of Contracts, supra note 2, at 1244-45, O'Connor, supra note 16, at
941-42; Singer, supra note 2, at 720-23.
147 See, e.g., Fische], supra note 55, at 1264.
148 See EASTERBROOK & FISCIIEL, supra note 18, at 90.
149
 See O'Connor, supra note 16, at 907 (noting that one-fourth of the total workforce and
over half of the male workforce remain at the same company for at least 20 years) (citing Robert
E. Hall, The Importance of Lifetime Jobs in the U.S. Economy, 72 Am. Ecox. REV. 716,724 (1982)).
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Marleen O'Connor has offered an argument to support the
claim that the implicit and explicit contracts between management
and workers are long-term, relational and impossible to reduce to even
a detailed writing. First, she argues that participatory management
programs are increasingly becoming the norm in United States work-
places.'" The participatory style of work management in some ways
puts workers at greater risk than they were subject to under the tradi-
tional regime of management, which sought to maximize productivity
by developing a high degree of specialization among workers.' 5 ' Par-
ticipatory programs ask workers to develop more firm-specific skills,
which, as discussed above, make these workers more vulnerable to
employer opportunism.' 52 Workers may demand safeguards against this
opportunism but, as O'Connor points out, the workers and manage-
ment will be unable to ensure these safeguards through collective
bargaining. 153 Collective efforts to improve productivity "simply cannot
be written into detailed, contractual specifications."154 Moreover, deci-
sions on strategic matters that affect the entire company—matters such
as production processes and investment rates—"do not lend them-
selves to the collective bargaining process. The reason is that neither
management nor labor has perfect foresight; thus, substantial prob-
lems of information and enforcement that arise as a result of bounded
rationality and opportunistic conduct impede efforts to protect em-
ployees against every contingency in explicit contracts." 155 Contracts,
therefore, if we mean contracts negotiated through collective bargain-
ing, are simply insufficient to meet the needs of contemporary labor
relations.
O'Connor also posits that the contractual relationship between
employers and employees is doomed to vagueness because neither side
"can credibly commit . . . [through] traditional explicit and implicit
contractual safeguards" to a bargain in which the workers provide the
highest level of effort in return for the best working conditions.' 56
Workers face difficulty in giving credible commitments to provide their
best efforts, for example, and employers face barriers in offering cred-
ible commitments for employment security. Contracts for job security,
according to O'Connor, are costly to draft and enforce.' 57 Without such
15° See id. at 911.
151 See id.
152 See id. at 923; supra notes 89, 84, 142 and accompanying text.
153 See O'Connor, supra note 16, at 916.
Im Id.
155 Id.
156 Id. at 918.
157 See id. at 919.
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contracts, workers cannot trust management and cannot invest in
firm-specific skills without leaving themselves vulnerable to employer
opportunism. Knowing that employees are not providing the highest
level of effort, employers will lack incentives to provide job security.
Thus workers and managers often find themselves in a "prisoners'
dilemma." Both parties desire that the workers provide the highest
level of effort in return for the best working conditions, but neither
party can "credibly commit to achieve this outcome by using traditional
explicit and implicit contractual safeguards." 158 O'Connor points to the
work of economist Harvey Leibenstein, who proposes that workers and
employers can partially ameliorate such prisoners' dilemmas by estab-
lishing "effort conventions."' 59 These "conventions" are essentially in-
formal and implicit understandings about the appropriate level of
effort and working conditions.
For present purposes, O'Connor's key insight is that the relation-
ship between management and workers is at least as relational and
irreducible to writing as the relationship between management and
shareholders. Workers and management thus face significant barriers
to contracting, in that they face huge transaction costs in reducing to
writing all the implicit understandings necessary to reach the outcome
best for both parties. If the presence of fiduciary duties are necessary
in the shareholder-management context to serve as gap-filling and
contract-enforcing devices, they certainly could serve an analogous
purpose in the employment relation.
Indeed, there are reasons to believe that fiduciary duties are more
important in the worker/management relationship than in the share-
holder/management relationship. First, and perhaps most centrally,
fiduciary duties are primarily about relationships.' 6° As noted above,
the interaction between workers and the firm is much more relational
than that between the shareholder and the firm.' 5 ' Most shareholders
of public corporations have little in the way of a genuine relationship
158 O'Connor, supra note 16, at 918,
159 See id. at 920 Wang HENRY LEIDENSTEIN, INSIDE THE FIRM: TUE INEFFICIENCIES OV
HIERARCHY 77-78 (1987)).
10 See, e.g., Lawrence E. Mitchell, Trust. Contract. Process., in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW,
supra note 2, at 185, 190 ("Fiduciary relationships are, characteristically, relationships of power
and dependency."). See generally Scott FitzGibbon, Fiduciary Relationships Are Not Contracts: A
Defense of Fidelitatis Connexio Against the Assault by Utilitarianism and Economic Analysis, 81
MAN. L, REV. (forthcoming Summer 1998)..
181 O'Connor's work is central here as well. See generally O'Connor, Economic justice, supra
note 2; O'Connor, Nexus of Contracts, supra note 2. While the focus of this Article is on corpora-
tions, this argument from the relational basis of fiduciary duty might conceivably be extended to
all employer/employee relationships, even when the employer is not a corporation. I am thankful
to James R. Repeal for this point.
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with the companies in which they hold stock, other than as arms-length
investors.' 62
 A typical shareholder may have a significant amount of
turnover in her portfolio in any given year. Workers, by contrast, have
a close connection to the firm that employs them and may hold their
jobs for years.
The second reason why fiduciary duties seem more important in
the labor relationship is the fact that shareholders already have many
other ways to enforce their implicit and explicit agreements with man-
agement. As discussed above in Part II, shareholders have available a
number of avenues to reduce the agency costs inherent in their rela-
tionship with management: an efficient capital market, the market for
corporate control, a vigorous market for corporate managers who
maximize shareholder welfare. Workers enjoy many fewer market pro-
tections from managerial exploitation and shirking.
In addition, shareholders actually have much greater power to
engage in genuine negotiation with management, especially at the
time a firm is issuing stock (whether in an initial or secondary offer-
ing). Though individual shareholders may not have access to the ne-
gotiations, the concerns of shareholders are ably represented by ven-
ture capitalists, investment bankers, large institutional shareholders
and the like. The vast majority of workers, on the other hand, must
engage in one-on-one bargaining with the firm, when bargaining oc-
curs at all. Indeed, workers face explicit obstacles to bargaining that
investors do not. Even when workers are represented by unions, under
the existing framework for collective bargaining, firms have no legal
duty to negotiate with unions about economic restructuring, techno-
logical innovation and job security.' 63 Even more jarring to the contrac-
tarian assumptions about the power of workers to bargain is the fact
that specific kinds of contracts that unions actually win become null
and void after some corporate takeovers.' 64
 Thus, even when workers
162 See Soderquist & Vecchio, supra note 19, at 836. In their survey, Soderquist and Vecchio
asked shareholders whether they agreed with the statement: "Owning stock in a large, publicly
held corporation is more like owning a corporate bond than like being a partner in a partner-
ship." Id. The survey found that 16.1% of shareholders agreed somewhat with that statement,
20.6% moderately agreed and 21.2% strongly agreed (a total of 57.9% in agreement). See id.
Shareholders were also asked whether they agreed with the statement that: "Shareholders in large,
publicly held corporations should be considered as investors rather than owners." Id. Of the
shareholders polled, 13.3% agreed somewhat, 25.6% agreed moderately and 20.6% agreed
strongly (a total of 59.5% in agreement). See id.
163 See First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 681-86 (1981) (no duty to
bargain over the decision to terminate business); Otis Elevator Co., 269 N.L.R.B. 891, 893-94
(1984) (no duty to bargain over relocation); see also O'Connor, supra note 16, at 940; Van Wezel
Stone, supra note 16, at 56-58.
164 See Van Wezel Stone, supra note 16, at 62 ("In the event of a sale of assets, the labor law
successorship rules hold that the preexisting collective bargaining agreement does not survive
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do in fact enter into contracts, their efforts are sometimes erased. The
relative benefit of fiduciary duties, then, would be much greater in the
employment relation than in the investor/management relation. Be-
cause the relative benefit of a legal protection is an important aspect
of determining the appropriateness of a legal norm, the relative bal-
ance in this respect is also in favor of workers.
Third, there is greater reason to doubt that the actual contracts
resulting from negotiation between workers and management are the
result of purely voluntary and consensual interchanges. One of the key
assumptions within the contractarian framework (it is an important
part of the first chapter of Easterbrook and Fischel's book) is that all
the important terms within the shareholder/managerial contract are
priced through the efficient capital market. The fact that the terms all
have a price associated with them means that contractarians can call
the complete contract "consensual" in that all powers the managers
retain in corporate governance reduce the price the firm can get for
its securities, and any shareholder who buys the security can be said to
have agreed completely to the contract. As Easterbrook and Fischel
state, "[a] lt the terms in corporate governance are contractual in the
sense that they are fully priced in transactions among the interested
parties." 65 Terms need not actually be negotiated; "the pricing and
testing mechanisms are all that matter. "166 Put another way, "[t] he price
[of a company's securities] reflects the effects, good or bad, of corpo-
rate law and contracts, just as it reflects the effects of good and bad
products."t°
Moreover, it is crucial to the contractarian argument that there
are no perceptual biases in the pricing of the terms of corporate
governance.' 68 That is, if parties to a contract systematically underesti-
mate certain risks or overestimate the chances of beneficial outcomes,
or if parties are unaccustomed to certain problems or risks, the chance
of mistake is high. According to the contractarians, these risks of
systematic mistakes are low in the capital market because even though
individual investors may know little about corporate governance, the
against the new corporate entity. Nor does it survive most mergers.") (citing Howard Johnson
Co. v. Detroit Local.foint Exec. Bd., 417 U.S. 249 (1974); NLRB v. Burns Inel See. Serv., Inc., 406
U.S. 272 (1972); John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964)). For an argument that
successorship rules should be used to protect workers, see Michael C. Harper, Defining the
Economic Relationship Appropriate for Collective Bargaining, 39 B.C. L. Rim (Mar. 1998) (Part IV).
165 EASTERIIROOK Sc FISCIIEL, supra note 18, at 17.
166 Id.
167 Id. at 19.
I RI See id. at 22-24.
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prices of securities are set by professional investors in a liquid market,
and "[t] hese prices protect ignorant investors automatically."' 69
Note, however, that workers are not aided in either respect by
"liquid markets with professional investors setting price."'" The labor
market is much less efficient than the securities market, so it is much
less likely that every term in the "contract" between firm and worker
will be priced correctly. If the prices (i.e., wages plus other compensa-
tion) are less likely to reflect the true underlying "value" of the job,
then we can less easily assume that the workers' agreement to enter
into the contract is truly "consensual," as contractarians use that term.
Also, if workers have a relatively difficult time leaving their jobs and
finding an adequate substitute, then their decisions to remain in their
present positions are less reflective of their genuine preferences than
investors' decisions to retain a certain bundle of shares."' Moreover,
the inefficiency of the market and the relative scarcity of professional
price-setters in the labor market makes the likelihood of systematic
mistake much greater.'" To be sure, unions may assist in setting prices
in the labor market and may mimic, to some extent, what professional
investors and market makers do in the capital market. But unions
represent only a small percentage of all workers in the United States.
It is unrealistic to assume that unions are as powerful in the labor
market as professional investors are in the capital market.'" Even
169 ./d. at 23-24.
1741 EASTERD ROOK & FISCIIEL, supra note 18, at 25.
171 See Greenfield, supra note 14, at 749. The mistake of assuming the free and cost-free
movement of workers from one job to another is a common one in the contractarian literature.
See, e.g., WOLFSON, supra note 21, at 100 ("In the free enterprise corporate system, however,
workers are free to move from one corporation to the next in search of a trade off between wages
and working conditions that will best satisfy their individual preference.").
173
	 example of possible perceptual biases involves the barriers individuals erect in
their own minds against information that conflicts with their present activity. Consider Robert
Ellickson's example of workers' compensation statutes, first adopted in the early twentieth cen-
tury, which made employers strictly liable for employee injuries suffered on the job. See Robert
C. Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to Rational Actors: A Critique of Classical Law
and Economics, 65 Ctil.-KENT L. REV. 23,42-43 (1989). If the labor "contract" worked in Coasian
terms, these statutes would not have increased employer safety efforts because employees would
have agreed to wage concessions in order . to obtain the efficient level of job safety. See id. at 42.
The evidence, however, is that these statutes did indeed significantly improve worker safety. See
id. at 42 & 11.57. Ellickson posits that one possible explanation for this result is what he calls
"cognitive dissonance": "once on a job, an employee might start walling out information about
its hazards, and thus come to undervalue the benefits of innovations in safety equipment." Id. at
43. I would add that to the extent that workers receive less information from their employers in
the first place, both because of the fact that the workers cannot negotiate for information
disclosure very easily and because it is not required by law to the same extent as in the capital
market, such "cognitive barriers" are more likely.
175 See Greenfield, supra note 14, at 781-82. Unions are relatively weak in the United States
compared to other industrial nations, and their strength is in a period of historical decline. Fewer
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contractarians concede that the marketplace protects capital investors
more than any other party to the corporate contract: "[T] he most
powerful device for protecting participants in the [corporate] ven-
ture—liquid markets with professional investors setting price—applies
exclusively to investors, principally equity investors."'" The contractari-
ans nevertheless believe that shareholders constitute the only parties
to the corporate contract who should be the beneficiaries of the direc-
tors' fiduciary duties imposed by law. if the justification for fiduciary
duties is based on difficulties with contracting, it would seem to make
sense for workers to be the beneficiaries of such duties as well.
V. EFFICIENCY
It appears, therefore, that none of the dominant contractarian
justifications for shareholder preeminence adequately distinguishes
the interests of shareholders from those of workers. Workers, too, bear
agency costs of monitoring management; they retain an unfixed, resid-
ual interest in their firm; and they are parties to long-term, relational
contracts with management in which it is very difficult to reduce
all important aspects of the agreement to writing. Contractarians make
one additional argument. In a sense, it underlies all the others.
Though it represents a fundamental assumption of contractarian an-
alysis, it is often left understated. I am referring to the notion of
efficiency, defined as making decisions based on maximizing utilitarian
value, measured by willingness to pay. Macey makes the claim explicitly
in his discussion of why only shareholders should receive the right to
vote for directors: "Shareholders retain the ultimate right to control
corporations because they value this right more than do other groups
and because it is therefore more efficient for them to retain control."'"
In other words, voting rights are held by shareholders and fiduciary
duties flow to shareholders simply because they are willing to pay more
for those rights than is any other party to the corporate contract.
This final claim is probably the most important one contractarians
make. One way to characterize the other claims for shareholder domi-
nance is that they are not justifications for shareholder supremacy per
se, but simply reasons why shareholders are willing to pay more to be
than one out of every five workers in the United States is represented by a union. See Van Wezel
Stone, supra note 3, at 578 (stating that, between 1980 and 1990, union membership declined
from almost 25% of the nonagricultural work force to less than 17%); see also INTERNATIONAL
LABOR OFFICE, WORLD LABOR REPORT 1993, at 34 tb1.3.1 (1993) (showing union density in the
United States at 15% in 1989 compared to for example, 32% in Germany, 39% in the United
Kingdom, 45% in Australia and 81% in Sweden).
"4 EASTERIIROOK & FisctiaL, supra note 18, at 25.
' 75 Macey, supra note 20, at 175.
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supreme. The real, core reason for having the law award shareholders
sole beneficiary status, according to the contractarians, is that absent
all obstacles to contracting, shareholders would simply be willing to
pay more for that status, and the law should recognize such prefer-
ences.'" Moreover, contractarians argue, we know that shareholders
value these rights more than anyone else because, as a positive matter,
that is what one observes within corporate doctrine.'" If others valued
the right to have fiduciary duties run to them more than shareholders,
they would simply purchase those rights from the shareholders.'"
One can contest this contractarian claim on at least two levels.
First, even if efficiency ought to be the basis for making public policy
judgments, there are reasons to doubt that what one observes in
corporate law truly represents the aggregate preferences of all those
involved. That is, if transaction costs in fact were zero, and if other
market flaws were corrected for, one might observe a corporate regime
quite different from the one dominant today. Second, there is a more
fundamental critique of the efficiency norm as the basis for public
policy. The efficiency norm is rooted in utilitarianism, and there is a
powerful argument that public policy should include substantial con-
cern for non-utilitarian values.
Some of the reasons to doubt that the shareholder dominance we
observe in contemporary corporate doctrine is in fact efficient were
noted in Part IV above. The labor market is much less efficient than
the capital market in pricing the terms of the "contract" with the firm.
Workers have fewer institutional mechanisms (including affirmative
disclosure requirements and fraud protection) to enable them to en-
gage in genuine negotiation with their firms. There is thus less reason
to be confident that the "contract" with management is not based at
least in part on perceptual biases or mistake. Also, due to the lack of
liquidity in the labor market—that is, because of the difficulties a
worker faces in moving from one job to another—a worker's observed
behavior of staying in a job can less certainly be said to reveal her
preference of that job over another.
176 See EasTEutittoott & FtscrtEL, supra note 18, at 15 ("The normative thesis of the book is
that corporate law should contain the terms people would have negotiated, were the costs of
negotiating at arm's length for every contingency sufficiently low.").
177 See id. ('The positive thesis [of this book] is that corporate law almost always conforms
to this model."),
176
 This notion is of course based on the Coase theorem, which posits that, absent transaction
costs, market participants will bargain around any given regulation so that those who value a right
most will end up owning it. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & Eco:g. 1 (1960);
see also POSNER, supra note 118, at 42-48.
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In addition, such inefficiencies in the labor market provide sig-
nificant reason to be concerned that the shareholder/management
contract actually externalizes costs of that agreement onto workers.
Importantly, even contractarians believe that actual contracts can be
trumped if they have adverse effects on third parties.' 79 Contractarians
argue, however, that the corporate contract does not create any third
party effects because all participants in the corporate enterprise are
parties to the corporate "contract" and can protect themselves through
negotiation. 18° The explicit assumption is that there are no externalities
because workers are voluntary participants in the firm and have the
power to protect themselves. As Easterbrook and Fischel argue, "[t]he
corporation's choice of governance mechanisms does not create sub-
stantial third-party effects—that is, does not injure persons who are not
voluntary participants in the venture . . . [E]mployees . . . can par-
ticipate or go elsewhere."' 8 '
On a simple level, Easterbrook and Fischel's claim that the choice
of governance mechanisms does not hurt workers is facially untrue. A
corporate "contract" that requires shareholders' interests to be placed
ahead of all others causes workers to be hurt in concrete circum-
stances, whether plant closings, takeover contests, or wage negotia-
tions. But what Easterbrook and Fische' almost certainly mean to assert
is that workers cannot be hurt ex ante because they will demand wage
or other concessions from the firm to compensate for being subject to
the shareholder-dominance rule. If they do not like the concessions
the firm offers, they can "go elsewhere." In other words, for the con-
tractarian argument to be persuasive, one must believe that in a firm
with a rule of shareholder dominance—that is, a firm in which the
directors have a fiduciary duty to maximize shareholder returns even
when workers will be harmed—employees will negotiate and will win
benefits in return for being subject to the shocks and disruptions such
a rule allows or even requires.
It should be reiterated here that because of the inefficiencies and
illiquidity in the labor market, workers are much less able to "go
elsewhere," and they are much less able to demand and receive wage
179 See EASTEIUIROOK & FISCIIEL, supra note 18, at 23; see also 14. at 17 ("the pricing and
testing mechanisms arc all that matter, as long as there arc no effects on third parties").
18° See id. at 23. Easterbrook and Fischel argue that "Inlone of these justifications for
intervention applies to intra-corporate affairs." Id. They also state that Iplarticipation in corpo-
rations is uniquely amenable to contracting because even the ignorant have an army of helpers."
Id. at 24. They further note that " I uerything to do with the relation between the form and the
suppliers of labor ... is contractual." Id. at 16 (emphasis in original).
181 /d. at 17.
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and other concessions for being subject to the shareholder-dominance
rule. The agreement between shareholders and management, then,
may indeed include terms that externalize costs onto workers. 182 More
concretely, management can agree to owe fiduciary duties to share-
holders and to give voting rights to shareholders (in return for an
equity contribution of a greater amount or at a lower cost), knowing
that some of the costs of this agreement can be shifted to workers. This
point does not depend on an assertion about bargaining power per se,
nor does it rely on the importance of wealth redistribution to work-
ers.'" Rather, it depends on an awareness of the differences between
the nature of the labor input and the capital input. The very nature
of labor makes "pricing and testing mechanisms"' 84 much less perfect
than those in the capital market. It is very likely, then, that participants
in the capital market can and do enter into both explicit and implicit
agreements that take advantage of the core inefficiencies in the labor
market.
There are other market-based reasons to doubt that the corporate
"contract" now in place is the efficient one. There may be a divergence
between willingness-to-pay and willingness-to-accept. Workers may be
unwilling, given the present bundle of goods and rights they own, to
pay in wage concessions for the privileges of voting for directors or
having directors include their interests in corporate decision making,
even if they would refuse to accept an offered wage increase to give up
such rights if they already had them.'" Moreover, what one observes
as the allegedly revealed preferences of workers to work for firms with
a shareholder-dominant rule may be a result of preferences that are at
least partially endogenous to the present regime. If workers' prefer-
ences are determined at least in part by the existing regime, then it is
much more difficult to argue persuasively that the regime itself maxi-
mizes utility, measured by revealed preferences."6
1112 See Mitchell, supra note 16, at 605-06 (discussing externalities of corporate decisions).
183 See infra Part V.B.
181 EASTERRROOK FISCIIEL, supra note 18, at 17.
183 See Ellickson, supra note 172, at 35-37 (discussing the possibility that people will consider
the loss of something they already own valued at $X as worse than the loss of an opportunity to
gain something they did not already own valued at V(); O'Connor, Economic Justice, supra note
2, at 241-42 & n.192.
IN See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, LOVE'S KNOWLEDGE 62 (1990) (noting that one must be
skeptical of the notion that preferences of severely deprived people should be trusted, since
preferences adjust to what one's actual situation makes possible); CASS K. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE
RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY STATE 64-67 (1990) (discussing endo-
genous preferences).
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These market defects are likely to exist within the nexus of con-
tracts known as the corporation. Yet these inefficiencies and defects
are not taken by contractarians to be a basis for regulation, much less
a justification for replacing the shareholder-dominance rule. One must
wonder why market inefficiencies in the capital market are taken to be
a justification for shareholder dominance . (witness the rationale that
fiduciary duties are necessarily imposed by law because shareholders
cannot bargain for them on their own) but market inefficiencies in the
labor market are assumed away.
Finally, one might criticize the contractarian norm of efficiency
from outside of the value system of utilitarianism that forms its basis.
Scholars have debated for decades the use of efficiency as a value in
public policy, and philosophers have debated utilitarianism for even
longer. What may be worth noting in the present context is the fact
that the law of corporations is one of the few areas of law where the
virtues (no pun intended) of utilitarianism are so taken for granted as
to go largely unquestioned, It should suffice to say here that as there
are a number of reasons to question the preeminence of efficiency as
the touchstone for public policy in other areas of law and regulation,
there are similar grounds to question that norm in corporate law. As
a society, just as we do as individuals, we make decisions and prioritize
public policy choices based on a range of values. Efficiency is almost
certainly one of these. But so are incommensurables such as equality,
and dignity, and knowledge.'"
Perhaps, then, we should recognize that even in an efficient mar-
ket, workers will win relatively few concessions from management and
their shareholder bosses because, on balance, most shareholders are
affluent and most workers for whom fiduciary duties would matter
most are not.'" And because the ability of parties to bargain is a
function of their preexisting entitlements and wealth, we can be cer-
tain that the bargained-for, "efficient" outcome is best only if we believe
that the preexisting circumstances accord with our societal judgments
of what is fair and just. 189 If preexisting circumstances are not consistent
with what we aspire to as a society, we might want to use corporate law
157 See Joseph William Singer, Entitlement 55 (manuscript of December 1997, on lilc with
author) ("Consequentialist analysis is indeterminate unless we choose baselines from which to
start our analysis and considerations of justice are essential to choose appropriate baselines.").
188 Whilc the richest 10% of this nation's citizens owns 89% of the nation's total stock assets,
see Does America Still Work?, supra note 22, at.44, a person's yearly earnings for full-time work at
minimum wage is about $10,300. (The poverty level for a family of four is about $15,600). See
Federal Minimum Wage Increases to $5.15 an Hour, WALL. ST. J., Sept. 2, 1997, at A2.
189 See Singer, Reliance Interest, supra note 2, at 649.
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as we sometimes use other branches of our law, to ameliorate systemic
imbalances and injustices that characterize our economy. Perhaps we
would want to use the law to substitute democratic decisions for market
decisions. We could even choose to use the law to protect the weak
from the powerful, rather than aiding the powerful against the weak.
If these other values matter, as I believe they do, there is no prima facie
reason why corporate law should not be influenced by these values,
just as they influence environmental law, constitutional law and tax law.
CONCLUSION
This Article has examined leading justifications for shareholder
dominance in corporate law, with special attention to whether these
justifications also apply to workers. Traditionally, shareholders have
been the beneficiaries of fiduciary duties and are the only ones to vote
for directors because shareholders are considered the owners of the
enterprise. This assertion of ownership turns on other, more sophisti-
cated bases and has fallen away from being the dominant justification.
The contemporary narrative of corporate law bases shareholder pre-
eminence on the importance of reducing agency costs, on the residual
nature of the shareholders' claim, on the difficulty shareholders face
in gaining explicit contractual protection, and on efficiency, i.e., the
shareholders' willingness and ability to "pay" more than other stake-
holders for supremacy.
These justifications for shareholder preeminence, however, do not
adequately distinguish the interests of shareholders from those of
workers. Workers, too, bear agency costs of monitoring management
to ensure that management fulfills its part of the implicit and explicit
understandings that define the relationship. Workers, too, retain an
unfixed, residual interest in their firm; their fortunes rise when the
company does well, and they are worse off when the company foun-
ders. Workers, too, enter into long-term, relational contracts with man-
agement in which it is very difficult to reduce all important aspects of
the agreement to writing. The fact that workers have much in common
with shareholders argues for a closer examination of the affirmative
arguments for the creation of fiduciary duties running to workers and
for worker participation in company management.
Finally, there are reasons to doubt that what one observes as a
positive matter in corporate law is an accurate reflection of the prefer-
ences of all the parties to the corporate "contract." Because of ine-
fficiencies in the labor market (many of which are simply assumed away
in leading corporate law scholarship), workers have much less ability
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than shareholders to exact bargaining concessions from other con-
tracting parties or simply to walk away. These inefficiencies also make
it more possible that the shareholder/management "contract" exter-
nalizes some of the costs of their agreement onto workers.
Even if these inefficiencies did not exist, there are grounds to
question whether efficiency should be the sole policy basis for corpo-
rate law doctrine. There is no doubt that, on the whole, shareholders
are able to "pay" more than workers for the privilege of preeminence.
Efficiency, however, is but one basis for public policy. Other bases for
public policy include fairness, justice and concern for human dignity.
These ideals generally do not, but could, influence corporate law
doctrine as they influence other areas of law. Corporate law would be
the better for it.
